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Abstract 
This study investigates the current and future economic viability of the Suez Canal. 
Therefore, the author set out to investigate the claimed dramatic drop in the Suez 
Canal revenue since the last quarter of 2008 through initially assessing the internal 
efficiency including the administrative and operational regimes of the Suez Canal and 
then assessing the impact of the economic slowdown and maritime piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden. 
For this purpose a number of interviews were conducted with experts in the field 
including ships masters who are currently using or have transited the Suez Canal in 
the past five years. Other, interviews were also conducted with port managers and 
operational managers in a general cargo carrier. Data collection also included 
questionnaire designed and distributed to 20 shipping companies based in the UK and 
Europe, from which a 25% response rate was received. 
Part of the key findings of this research is that the inefficiency of the internal regime 
of the Suez Canal has considerably contributed to the failure of the Suez Canal 
Authority in responding and alleviating the impact of the global recession and 
maritime piracy on their service. In terms of the administrative regime, the lack of 
coordination between different stakeholders, ineffective formalities organization and 
complex rate regime were screened to be significant problems. In terms of the 
operational regime, some concerns were raised by the respondents and interviewees 
about the long waiting time, the physical limitations of the Canal and the inefficiency 
of the Suez's pilots. 
Amongst all the previously mentioned problems, the assessment of the external forces 
reveals that the Suez Canal Authority cannot do much about them; however, a better 
administrative and operational regime would have put the Canal Authority in a better 
position. The conclusion of this research project suggests few temporary and long 
term remedial actions which were identified through several suggestions from 
interviewees and personal observations. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction: 
The face of the world is lined and furrowed by great commercial highways along 
which the trade of mankind is concentrated... considers that statistics of the Suez and 
Panama canals to be the temperature charts ofthe planet...by studying these canals we 
are felling the pulse of world and measuring it rhythm". (Siegfried, 1940, 
Introduction) 
The concept of globalisation appeared only after the WWII, leading to the emergence 
of new geographical trade leading to rapid increase in the mobility of merchandise 
and humans. This phenomenon is rapidly boosted with the increase in ship sizes and 
types and enhancement in logistical chains, infrastructure and the appearance of 
multimodal transport. The commercial dynamism can only be explained by the fact 
that during the last two decades, distances between trading regions have diminished 
dramatically leading to quick turnaround. The shrinking in distanc:e is largely due to 
the several waterways, straits or canals that joined seas. One of these waterways is the 
"Royal Road" the Suez Canal which serves nearly all the European-Asian markets. 
This canal with its current approach of function will reach its capacity limits to 
accommodate more and large ships during its 24 hours cycle. As a result, the canal 
needs to adapt in the years to come in order to preserve its exclusivity and importance 
to international trade. In this study, the author wishes to verify and investigate the 
current and future economic feasibility and viability of the Suez Canal in respect with 
the current global recession, the increase in maritime piracy and decline in the canal's 
internal performance. The next part will provide a thorough background about the 
Suez Canal's development and introduce some facts and figures confirming the 
decrease in the Suez Canal performance. 
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1.2 Brief History of the Suez Canal: 
Being one of the imperative links between the Far East and Europe, Suez Canal have 
played a vital role since late is" century by intensifying seaborne trade. Since then, it 
had witnessed dramatic changes with Napoleon Bonaparte's discovery of the ancient 
North South Canal running between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. His attempts 
to construct the canal connecting both seas were abandoned after survey results 
showed that there was a difference of water levels between the two seas amounting to 
10 metres and locks based canal was inevitable. A century later, Ferdinand De 
Lesseps, a French savant announced that the difference of water level is negligible. 
He then obtained a concurrence from Said Pasha, the successor of Abbas Pasha in 
Egypt, to create La Companie Universale de Canal Maritime de Suez, so to construct 
the canal and to open it for international navigation. It took 10 years of excavation and 
dredging to open it finally for navigation in 1869. From then on, the world has 
recognised the canal's significance for international trade by playing a vital role in the 
European penetration and colonization of Africa. The Egyptian share of the canal was 
then sold to the British as Said Pasha was forced to do so in order to pay his debts in 
1875. With France holding the majority of shares, and Britain the remains of it, La 
Companie Universale de Canal Maritime de Suez was said to be a country in another 
country (BBC Four, 'Suez crisis, the other side of Suez1956'), as all the money 
received from tolls was divided between shareholders. This situation led to the Suez 
crisis with Jamal Abdu EI Nasser; the Egyptian president who nationalized the Suez 
Canal in 1956. Once the Canal had been nationalized, the British set pressure on the 
Egyptians to show that they are capable of running the canal and Egyptian pilots were 
good as Europeans pilots. Years later, with the backup of the United Nations 
Peacekeepers and financial pressures from US, the British withdrew their interest 
from the Suez Canal. After 11 years of war, the canal was closed and then re-opened 
again for navigation in June 1975. Since then, new rules of navigation have been in 
place by the Suez Canal Authority. The image below shows, a bird eye view of the 
Suez Canal 
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Image 1: The Suez Canal a bird view (Source: Google photos, 2009) 
1.3. Development of the Suez Canal: 
Currently, the Suez Canal is owned by the state of Egypt, operated and maintained by 
the Suez Canal Authority. It has been one of the important non-locks waterways in the 
world. It extends up to a distance of 195 km long from the Port Said north to Port 
Suez in the south. Its strategic location enabled the liaison of "two oceans and two 
seas: the Atlantic and Mediterranean via Gibraltar to Port Said, and the Indian 
Ocean and the red sea via Bab Al Mandab". (Mohamed, 2004). The significance of 
the Suez Canal to global trade and the supply chain lays both in its strategic and 
commercial benefits as it reduced distance and saved a significant cost and time. 
According to Suez Canal Authority (SCA) distance calculation; a voyage between 
Tokyo and Rotterdam via the Cape of Good of Hope is 14 507Nrn, whereas it takes 
only 11192 Nm to travel via the Suez Canal with an average transit time of 16 hours, 
therefore a saving of 23% in distance and 86% saving between the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Saudi Arabia. (Appendix 1) 
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Table 1: The Development of the Suez Canal since 1869 
(Source: http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show==11) 
Development of the Cross sectional Area 
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Max Loaded Ship Cross sectional Area 
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1111 lit 
.1lit 
_lit 
I_lit 
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240000 DWT 
Image 2: Development of the Cross Sectional Area 
(Source: http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show==12) 
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From Table 1 and Image 2 above, the physical characteristics of the Canal have 
developed dramatically since 1869. According to the SCA, the canal currently allows 
ships as large as 220,000 Ton load or 62 feet of draft, maximum of 68 m above water 
level and a maximum beam of 254 feet. Some large tankers, unable to transit the 
canal, can load part of their cargo in The SUEMED pipelines or use one of canal 
owned ships to reduce the load then re-load it again at the end of the canal. (Suez 
Canal Authority, 2009). 
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13,986 13,447 15667 16850 18224 18664 20384 21415 
Figure 1: Number of ships transiting the Suez Canal every year since 2001 
(Source: Suez Canal Authority's Annual report, 2009) 
The number of vessels has increased by 33.28% from 2001 to 2008 with an increase 
in cargo volume of 49.98 % for the same period. The nature of the Canal with its 300 
metre wide and 1000 feet at it narrowest point allows an average of 70 ships and 4.5 
million bid flows through the Suez Canal. Its rapid traffic evolution is a clear 
indicator of the magnitude of the canal in facilitating international trade which makes 
it one of the vital chokepoints for oils trade. 
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Suez Canal Tolls 
receipts, 3.2 
Figure 2: Suez Canal share of the Service Sector 
(Source: Central Bank of Egypt Report, 2009). 
The Canal also generates a significant income for the Egyptian economy after 
Tourism; with the Canal contributing by 3.2 % in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in the Service Sector which accounts for 45 % of the overall GDP in all sectors. 
Revenue of the Canal comes mainly from the fees charged for transit and the deck 
container surcharge for General and Containerships. The tariff is based on the vessel's 
Suez Canal Net Registered Tonnage (SCNRT) with the authority categorising vessel 
into eight classes of ships, each of them is charged separately. 
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1.4. Rational of this study: 
Total Number of vessel transiting the Suez 
Canal between Septemer 2008 and May 
2009 
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Figure 3: Total number of vessels transiting the Canal between Sep. 2008 - May 2009 
Source: (Suez Canal Authority Report, 2009) 
From the statistics provided by the SCA, it can be seen that has been a sharp decline 
in the number of ships and cargos transported via the canal since September 2008. 
The Suez Canal Authority announced a 7.2% decline in revenue during the period 
January 2009 and July 2009 (Aljazeera News Channel, 27 July 2009, 20 00 Hrs). This 
decline is mainly due to the ongoing global recession and maritime piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden. These elements are mainly short tenn problems. Nevertheless, they pose 
major risks on the economic viability of the Suez Canal for ship-owners, charterers 
and the shipping community, as many shipping companies are diverting their fleets 
around the Cape of Good Hope. Yet other factors such as the internal efficiency of the 
Suez Canal Authority could be one of the contributing factors to this decline. In the 
framework of this study, we are particularly interested in the Asia-Europe market and 
the reason I am conducting this is mainly because not much attention has been given 
to understand the impact of these factors on the global commerce and the Suez Canal 
survival. In fact, the Suez Canal will soon reach it limit (Drewry, 2008) as granting 
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access to larger vessels will increase the number per vessel per convoy; and as a 
consequence increase waiting affecting other trades. Shipping companies transit via 
the Suez Canal for two main reasons to save cost and time. These mentioned internal 
and external factors will inevitably increase the days and consequently cost, 
determining the new dynamism of the Asian-Europe trade. 
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Figure 4: Total volume of cargo carried via the Suez Cana between Sept 200S-April 2009 
(Source: Suez Canal Authority Report, 2009) 
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Chapter 2: Aims, Objectives and Methodology: 
2.1. Aims and Objectives: 
This research project was born partly out of the necessity to provide an early 
assessment of the internal and external factors leading to the decline in the revenue of 
the Suez Canal. The internal factors will take into account the efficiency of the service 
provided by the Suez Canal in term of the handling of the administration and 
operations services. Then, an assessment of the external factors leading to this decline 
through looking at the global financial crisis and the impact of maritime piracy with 
respects to Somalia on the international trade via the Suez Canal, the profitability of 
Suez Canal Authority and their future development, taking into account the possibility 
of the aforementioned unintended consequences. 
Specifically, the research aims at (1), assessing the impact of global recession and 
piracy in the Hom of Africa on the economic validity of the Suez Canal; (2), assessing 
the efficiency of the Suez Canal as an organisation; (3), and to critically evaluating 
ways of improving efficiency of the Suez Canal. 
In exploring the above objectives, the study deals with the following fundamental 
questions that will be answered both in the literature review and the finding; then both 
primary and secondary material will be discussed and evaluated for the proposition of 
recommendations to mitigate the risk of more decline in revenues. Firstly, how the 
Suez Canal is managing the administration and operations aspects of the canal? What 
are their deficiencies and how could that be improved? Secondly, this study will be 
answering the questions of how the global recession could possibly affect the Suez 
Canal Authority and what are the main trades that are really hit hard, and could the 
Suez Canal do something to attract them back? Finally, is piracy really affecting the 
Suez Canal and are there measures related to this factors that can reverse the trend and 
attract back ship-owners as pirate attacks are increasing and spreading towards the 
Red Sea? 
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2.2 Methodology: 
2.2.1 Research methodology: 
Research methodology can be considered as a structure or guidelines for collecting, 
sorting out and organizing data in order to achieve certain outcomes. Alvesson and 
Deetz are of the opinion that research methodology can be considered as a structure or 
framework that enables the researcher to produce empirical materials and additional 
information that can help in understanding existing theoretical materials, (Alvesson et 
al, 2000: 58). 
In this research, the author intends to combine prosperity of secondary and primary 
data; the data will be obtained by means of interviews and responses through 
questionnaires, which have been designed to be administered on 20 respondents. 
However, the data will be dominantly extracted from personal interviews, as this 
method has proved to provide more flexibility and in-depth information, which could 
not be gained from structured questionnaires. 
2.2.2 Research Strategy: 
The researcher aims to analyse the efficiency of the Suez Canal, using financial data, 
traffic and cargo statistics, as well as academic materials and point of views in trade 
publications and internet materials tackling the relevant issues. Among others and in 
order to understand the current attitude of canal users and to identify and evaluate the 
reasons for the poor performance of the canal, different methodologies are used for 
each of the research objectives. 
•	 Objective 1: To assess the efficiency of the Suez Canal Authority: Personnel 
interviews have been conducted with masters currently transiting the canal. 
The reason for approaching masters because, they spend an average of 15 
hours in the canal and they are faced with all the operational and 
administrative services provided by the authority. These masters are located 
both in Tunisia and UK. Apart from masters, this study required more views 
from a managerial level in shipping companies as they are in direct relations 
with the Suez Canal authority. Therefore, a personnel interview has been also 
conducted with an operational manager in a shipping company located in 
Tunisia. To extend my research enquiry, a standard questionnaire has been 
10 
sent to General Managers and Commercial managers in several shipping 
companies. 
•	 Objective 2: To Assess the impact of global recession and maritime piracy as 
one of the factors leading to the poor performance of the Suez Canal: Primary 
data have been also collected from the same questionnaires sent to the 
shipping companies, as well as from an interview conducted with the 
operation manager of the Tunisian Ports. The reason for approaching this 
expert is because global recession is affecting the Suez Canal and it was 
assumed that the role of Suez Canal goes beyond feeding major European 
ports and affect transhipments activities in the some Mediterranean Like 
every other research work, this project has its own limitations. Firstly it 
doesn't cover a large number of shipping companies and it does not claim to 
be representative in way or the other of the Suez Canal Authority busy 
maritime activity. Secondly, it has not been possible to gain information for 
the SCA, with regards to this project, in spite of the numerous attempts to 
contact them via their various departments located in Alexandria, Egypt. 
•	 Objective 3: To critically evaluate ways on improving the efficiency of the 
Suez Canal: these objectives will combine different ideas that are collected 
from masters, port managers, and operations and commercial managers in 
shipping companies. These objectives will be then subjected to several criteria 
to determine their effectiveness as a way forward in improving the Suez Canal 
performance. 
2.2.3 Questionnaires: 
Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill view that questionnaires are not 
effective methods for exploratory and studies that requires a large numbers of open­
ended questionnaires (Saunders. M et aI, 2007). However, Robson argued that 
questionnaires are more effective if they are made standard and can be interpreted in 
the same way by all respondents (Robson, 2002). Therefore, questionnaires in this 
study are used to identify different opinions and particular organizational practices in 
dealing with different phenomena. This sample has been selected through looking at 
trade publications such as Lloyd List and the shipping company directory in the UK 
11
 
and Europe. Then a process of selection has been conducted to identify companies 
that are currently trading via the Suez Canal. The questionnaires are self administered 
by the respondents; as a result, the data collected relies on them for completion and 
return by email or post. As it has been difficult to gain access to managerial level, this 
posed a weakness in assessing the efficiency of the Suez Canal and the impact of 
global recession and piracy of the Suez Canal authority and international trade. But in 
order to ensure appropriate and decent responses to my questionnaires, I had 
conducted a pilot study with several colleagues of mine at the university level. After 
amendments and improvements the questionnaire then were sent to various potential 
respondents. 
2.2.4 Interviews: 
As part of this study I have managed to conduct six interviews; two over the phone 
and the rest were face-to-face interviews. I decided to go for the semi-structured 
interview method as this would give flexibility by allowing for new questions to be 
brought up during the interview. Some of interviews were recorded digitally and then 
transcribed. The data collected was then categorized into 4 different themes with 
regard to the objectives of this study and then analysed. 
2.2.5 Secondary data: 
Boslaugh argues that a major limitation in the secondary research is that the data 
collected is intrinsic in its quality, as this data is not meant to answer my research 
questions or specific information that may not be collected elsewhere (Boslaugh. 
S.2007: 4). Secondary data is defined by Saundlers as data that have been already 
collected for some other purposes (Saundlers Et al: 2007). This combines a wealth of 
books, published journals, trade publication, websites, presentations, seminars as well 
as trusted sources of internet articles and the Suez Canal Authority Press. The bulk of 
the literature review has been collected from Southampton Solent Library, the 
University of Northampton and the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(University of London), where a large amount of data has been acquired. 
I have tried to complete this study to the best of my capabilities and the resources that 
where available to me, in contrast it could have been completed in a better way if the 
12
 
seA accepted my request to conduct telephone interviews or send questionnaires and 
have access to their archive material. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review: 
3.1. Introduction: 
A literature research has been carried out and it has become clear that there are few 
books and academic journal references specifically about the efficiency of Suez 
Canal, which made the research more unique meanwhile challenging. However the 
author has found sufficient materials around the areas of research including trade 
publications, papers and presentations. 
3.2. The world trade regime and the Suez Canal 
Chokepoints have been defined by Rodrigue l.P as "a common concept in transport 
geography as they refer to locations that limit the capacity of circulation and cannot 
be easily bypassed, if at all. This implies that any alternative to Chokepoints involves 
a level of detour or the use of an alternative that amounts to substantial financial 
costs and time delay" (Rodrigue, 2004). These chokepoints, which will be referred to 
as straits or passages in this study, they playa vital role in feeding worldwide demand 
of energy. According to EIA (the Energy International Association), about one half of 
the world oil amounting to 43 million bbl/day had been carried by tankers through 
these passages. Therefore, their blockage can lead to substantial global energy crises. 
Six major straits serve the oil trade; the Strait of Hormuz connecting the Persian Gulf 
with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, the Panama Canal connecting the 
Caribbean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean; the Malacca strait, the main shipping line 
ween the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and handling one quarter of the world 
trade; the Istanbul strait also known as Bosporus, which connects the Black Sea and 
the Mediterranean Sea; Bab El-Mandab which connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of 
Aden, and finally the Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea 
which is the centre of attention of this study. 
14
 
3.3. Concerns for a canal ofhigh value- the Suez Canal 
3.3.1 Suez Canal from an economic perspective: 
The Suez Canal contributes by 3 to 4 % to the GDP of Egypt after tourism as a major 
contributor (Egypt National Bank report, 2009). Therefore, from an economic 
perspective any decrease in the government's income from the canal tolls will have an 
impact on the economic growth of the country. The graph below (figure5), originating 
from the Central Bank of Egypt, shows the amount received in million dollars from 
canal dues from the first quarter to 2007/2008 until the third quarter of 2008/2009. 
During the period 2007/2008 the tolls received witnessed an insignificant fluctuation, 
decreasing from 1298.1 US$ Mn in the Q2 to 1235.2 US$ Mn. From then the canal 
income increases dramatically to attain a ceiling of 1455.1 US$ Mn in the first 
Quarter of 2008/2009. 
The reason for not selecting dates prior the 2007/2008 is because the global economic 
crisis have started since that time to spread out of USA and the finance industry to 
affect other industries slowing down the international trade. A report published by the 
United Nations explains the reason for the economic crisis and argues that the "World 
trade volume is growing at only half the pace of recent years" (Lnited Nation staff, 
2009) and the volume of global trade have slowed to 4.4 % in 2008 compared to what 
it had been in 2007 of 8.7%. The volume of southbound and northbound trade going 
through the Suez Canal is vital to the global economy. In the first Quarter of 
2008/2009, the canal income started to decrease to attain a 950.4 CS$ Mn as declared 
by the Central Bank of Egypt, thus a massive decrease of 65% was witnessed in the 
third Quarter of2008. 
Canal receipts 
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Figure 5: Canal Receipts 2007-2009 (Source: Central Bank of Egypt CBE staff, 
2009) 
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This decline in the Canal's income has been followed by a decrease in revenue 
received from tolls followed by a decrease also in the number of ships and volume 
of cargo transported on ships. As illustrated in figure 6 sourced from the monthly 
and annual report published by the Suez Canal authority, it is confirmed that the 
total number of vessels transiting the Canal declined from 8143 in 2007 to 6,974 
in 2009. A CEO and senior analyst in the AfrikaSources; a monthly magazine, 
argued that the world economy has lead to a drop in the SCA's revenue by 200$ 
million or 13.4 % in the first quarter of 2008/2009 and this drop will have a long 
term affect that will urge the Suez Canal authority to amend their regulations and 
policies in order to satisfy ship-owners such as Mearsk line's AE7 service, CMA­
CGM container service and China shipping. (AfrikaSources staff, 2009). These 
shipping companies have as a result begun to divert their services around the Cape 
of Good Hope in order to avoid expensive tolls and the Somalia pirates in the Gulf 
of Aden. 
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Figure 6: Total number of vessels
 
(Source: Suez Canal Authority Annual Report, 2009)
 
3.3.2 Suez Canalfrom an administrative perspective: 
Part of this study is also to investigate the internal dynamics and factors that 
contribute to this decrease in traffic. The Suez Canal Authority is an organisation and 
profit making company that provides services and uses tangible and intangible 
resources to achieve their objectives. Administration of ships transiting the Suez 
Canal is a complex and multidimensional task involving several and correlated 
activities, where the SCA deals with several agents who in tum subcontract their 
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activities to third parties. All of these entities in the chain of organisations work for a 
common objective which is to service and satisfy shipping companies. Therefore, an 
effective management of the administration and choice of service providers, for 
instance for bunker or crewing, is vital in the overall satisfaction of masters and 
shipping companies. 
The role ofcanal Agents: 
After 30 years of state maritime monopoly (Muller, 2002: 146), the Egyptian 
government allowed partial privatization of their administrative sector by allowing 
outsourcing the daily operations to private shipping agents. Agents are licensed by the 
Suez Authority and given a share of the traffic according to their capability. 
According to the SCA website, currently there are 140 agents with Seabird Suez 
Canal, a private company sharing 14% of the market, and the rest is handled by other 
public owned companies. 
The Canal agents serve the need of ship-owners using the Canal. They handle all the 
commercial and operational side as well as financial and other services such as tolls 
calculation and rebates selections and parts sale and purchase and crewing. Therefore, 
they are in the heart of the operations, and the reputation of the authority lay in the 
hands of these agents. Every aspect of these activities relies on an efficient two-way 
data exchange mechanism, qualified and trained staff. As mentioned earlier, the Suez 
Canal is a public owned company. Daniel Muller argues in his book the Transport 
policies for the Euro- Mediterranean free trade area that one of the key issues that 
creates obstacles in the development of the Suez Canal is that the Egyptian 
government is not really realizing the full potential of the Suez canal as a strategic 
locations and as a "Gate Keeper" (Muller, 2002: 145). 
As a way of comparison, the Panama Canal is considered as non-profit organization. 
Its tolls are structured in a manner that covers their expenses. The Panamanian look at 
the long term benefits of the Canal rather than what they can get from its revenue. 
Their policies allow for private entities to come in and run every aspects of the Canal, 
which have lead to a greater improvement in the quality of service as well as the 
infrastructures around and in the Panama Canal (Muller, 2002: 145). 
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To get in depth, Daniel reported that policies adopted by the Egyptian government are 
missing what he called "an enabling policy framework". With this in mind Daniel 
indicated that the potential development and modernization of the administration 
regime is restricted within two main constraints: (l) the government budget, whereby 
spending will be restricted to what the government prioritizes and think it requires 
more attention than others. A study conducted by David Parker suggested that public 
ownership is to be believed efficient because the benefits associated with public 
ownership in low market condition could surpass the cost (Parker, 2000: 30). This 
could be one of the reasons explaining why a little attention has been paid to fully 
privatizing the Suez Canal and giving full control and budget independence to private 
entities. Parker also suggests that public ownership is desirable in a way that handling 
the commercial operations to a private body could cause economic distortion in the 
country (Parker, 2000: 31). (2)Other constraints include the heavy taxation regime, 
the strict and long administration regime and cumbersome formalities imposed. 
MUller argued that despite the new development of the administration regime since 
2000, "inefficient custom clearance service continues to be an important logistical 
bottleneck" (MUller, 2002: 146) for the SCA before and during a vessel can transit the 
Canal. Daniel also argued that according to the World Maritime Bank, the 
inefficiency of the Egyptian maritime sector has cost the Egyptian economy more 
than one Billion per year. He added that the authority requires a liberalization and 
privatization scheme to attract private investments and develop a more competitive 
environment (MUller, 2002: 145). 
Daniel Muller also argued that during his research he came across several private 
companies that are dealing with the Suez Canal; they portrayed the canal authority as 
"the most bureaucratic entity in Egypt" (MUller, 2002: 145) due to the fact that the 
SCA have not much control over of their canal agents including pilot company, 
Mooring boat companies, Searchlight companies, Lifting device companies, Ship­
Chandler companies and immigration and the several inspections officials. MUller 
adds that the SCA needs to look at the way the Panama canal runs their business and 
adopts a similar regime which he believed have resulted in greater improvement to the 
Panama Canal since the withdraw of the government from any commercial and 
operational activities. (MUller, 2002: 186) 
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Because, there is limited if not inexistent academic literature with regards to the 
efficiency of the administrative process before transiting the Canal, this section has 
dealt only with the difference between the efficiency of the administration between 
private and public owned companies. In order to get in details, Chapter 4 of this study 
investigates the administrative part in more details and from shipping companies and 
captains' perspectives. 
3.3.3 Suez Canal Authorityfrom an operational perspective 
3.3.3.1 Physical characteristics and shipping capacity of the Suez Canal 
Comparing to the Panama Canal's level of water in each side of the river, the Suez 
Canal has almost the same sea level in both ends. Therefore, making it possible for 
ships to transit without the need for locks, whereas transiting from the Caribbean Sea 
to the Pacific Ocean requires the use set of locks that lift the ship up and down to 
average it with the river level. The width of the canal is 180-200, though only 110m 
is navigable, there is no space for two way traffic. (Appendix 2) However vessels are 
allowed to pass each other in two sections; the Great Bitter lake hetween km 103 to 
km 113 allows 36 ships to anchor in the mooring area, the Ballah by Pass which is a 
man made mooring areas between km 51 to km 60. J.D Griffiths argued that Lake 
Timsah is 5 km and rather shallow at a large of breadth of its water periphery. 
Therefore, it cannot be used neither as a mooring area, nor to accommodate two way 
traffic. He added that this area could have the potential to reduce the congestion of 
ships mooring in the Bitter Lake, thus increasing the number of ships per convoy 
(Griffiths, 1995). Griffiths added that increasing the size of this area will not delay the 
daily transit of ships, as the shallow area is not used for merchants' vessels. 
Nevertheless, the SCA authority needs to amend their convoy systems which could 
affect the schedule of liner companies, (Griffiths, 1995) as this double parts of the 
canal have not changed since 1981. Griffiths et al indicated that one of the main 
constraints also in the Great Bitter Lake is the physical restriction as the areas 
capacity depends on the size of ships (Griffiths et al, 1987). 
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In his study, Griffiths assessed the characteristics of the Suez Canal against its 
shipping capacity and he concluded that the ultimate project will be to provide what 
he called "A dual water way" in the central area of the canal between 51 and 131 km, 
thus increasing the two way traffic sections within the canal from 42 Km to 80 km, 
and accordingly from Ballah By Pass to the Great Bitter Lake. This project will 
increase the transit capacity of the Canal to 112 standard ships (Griffiths, 1995). It can 
be argued here that this project could open new dimensions by reducing the waiting 
time and most importantly increasing the number of ships. Besides, this will 
encourage the authority to reduce tolls while maximising profit. However 
implementing such a project requires the interruption and the diversion of the traffic 
for a long period; in addition to the enormous cost of implementing such a project. 
3.3.3.2 Suez Canal Convoy systems with regard to time 
As it has been made clear in the preceding section, the major length of the Channel 
accommodates only one way traffic and the remaining sections allow vessels to pass 
one another. A convoy system has been in place for a long time. Two southbound 
convoys Nl and N2 transit from the Mediterranean to Suez, and one northbound 
convoy S1 for ships transiting towards the Mediterranean to the Suez operate each 
day. The First southbound convoy starts at OOOOh hours, and anchor at Bitter lake. At 
0600h, the Northbound starts moving from port Suez straight towards the Port Said 
without stopping. Meanwhile, the second southbound convoy N2 starts moving from 
Port Said and anchor in Ballah by Pass waiting for the northbound convoy to pass by. 
The Nl proceeds to Port Said followed by N2. The SCA has strict policies on the time 
limit for ships to arrive at the point of departures. A set of radars and sensors are 
placed in both ends of the Suez Canal. Ships arriving after 6 hours limit time before 
the starts of the convoy have to pay between 3 to 5% surcharge alongside the tolls. 
The transit time takes between 11 to 16 hours and the canal accommodates 78 ships 
per days both northbound and southbound. A study conducted by Griffiths suggests 
that altering the convoy system could be improved by as much as 44% increase in 
capacity. This figure does not represent the number of ships per 24 hours, but per 48 
hours. The results started with identifying what he called as "Dead-time". This period 
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refers to the time when there is no convoy. The red section in figure 7 refers to the 
dead- time, whereas the green section refers to the convoy moving. 
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Figure 7: Current Convoy Systems (Colours added, Source: Griffiths. 1995). 
Griffiths argued that this period amounts to 50% of the 24 hours, hence only half of 
the Canal's capacity is used. (Griffiths, 1995) This explains the increase in waiting 
time claimed by shipping companies as well as the reluctance of the Suez Canal to 
reduce tolls. One explanation could be that reducing the toll may increase the number 
of ships transiting the Canal, which in turn increases the waiting time causing delay 
and congestion. To reduce the dead-time or the time where the Canal is unproductive, 
J. D Griffiths suggested that the cycle of transit has to be expanded to 48 hours 
instead and the configuration of the convoy system needs to be altered (Griffiths, 
1995). Figure 8 retrieved from his research illustrate how the dead time could be 
reduced to as much as 20 % of the overall transit cycle. The response of the Suez 
Canal to this idea was not encouraging and they claimed that customers are already 
using the same systems for more than 20 years, and altering the cycle of transit could 
affect their business. In addition, increasing the number of ships per convoy will 
reduce the speed of transit and reduce the safety distance between two ships as the 
process of stopping a ship is very difficult in confined water. Yet, Griffiths suggested 
that the cycle of 48 hours could be implemented temporary if the number of vessels 
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increase during certain periods in order to sustain the normal waiting time 
experienced in normal market condition (Griffiths, 1995). 
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Figure 8: New convoy systems (Source: Griffiths, 1995) 
3.3.3.3 Pilotage, Navigation and Safety Features ofthe Canal: 
The Suez Canal has evolved through the years keeping up with the latest advances in 
navigation and marine technology. According to some sources the percentage of 
accidents is almost nil compared to other waterways. The Canal operates a strict 
policy of safety making Pilotage compulsory for every ship and tugs boats for large 
tankers. The Suez Canal implements two VTS stations at Gulf of Suez and Gulf of 
Aqaba and Central VTMS in Port Said. In a report published by the IMO in 2004, 
insurers and marine underwriters have had increasing concerns with regards to the 
Canal Pilotage standards, which was said to be not confirming with international 
standards, and the risk of grounding and collusion could be costly and leads to 
environmental disasters in the area. This report was published in 2004, however 
according to the SCA, the authority has put in place a Centre for Maritime Simulators 
(Appendix 3), with the main objectives of training pilots using Advance Bridge 
Simulator which imitates real ships environments in great details and they are 
extremely realistic. This enables pilots to use and maneuver different types of vessels, 
in different weather conditions and in emergency situations. In addition the centre 
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holds an analysis department that conducts assessments of incidents identifying 
causes and implementing risk management measures in order to mitigate them. 
Furthermore, the centre constantly studies the behaviour of different ships within the 
different parts of the Canal, (Appendix 4); as an imitation of the whole length of the 
Canal is constructed in miniature version which allows different ships to be tested 
against the physical characteristics of other Canals. From what one can see, and 
without referring to any evidence from academic material about the efficiency of the 
Suez pilots, it will be hard to confirm what the insurers and Marine Underwriters 
claim. Nevertheless, chapter 4 will discuss these issues from a master and shipping 
companies' perspectives. 
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3.3.4SuezCanaland the Global recession: 
3.3.4.1 Ships types, International trade and Suez Canal 
Without looking at the history of the current global recession, it will be hard to 
comprehend its implications on international trade and specifically on trade via the 
Suez Canal. The widespread of banking problems and the credit crunch in the USA 
and Europe has triggered in the 4th quarter of 2008 a fall in growth in other developed 
countries such as UK, Europe and Japan (Figure 9). Consumer demand for various 
goods has decreased. Such consumer products are outsourced from different parts of 
the world, most of it in Asia, making ships the most economical means of transport. 
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Figure 9: Growth in developed countries between 2007 and 2010 (Source: United 
Nation staff, 2009). 
To get a clear picture of the distribution of ship types transiting the Canal and those 
most hit by the recession, statistics retrieved from the Suez Canal Authority's monthly 
and annual reports are collapsed and put in the following pie chart and diagram 10 
and 11. The pie chart below illustrates the annual number of vessels transiting the 
Suez Canal brought to the author's attention, that only three trades, the tanker, the 
Bulk and Containerships are the major users of the canal with containership leading 
the list by 39%. After assessing the data, presented in Figure 11, 12 and 13, the author 
identified that the tankers and bulk carriers transiting the Canal are not contributing to 
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the decline in number of ships, whereas containerships are witnessing a sharp decline 
compared to previous months. 
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Figure 10: Total number of ships by type transit the Suez canal every Year (Source: SCA Annual 
report) 
This analysis was undertaken to narrow down the amount of research and focus it on 
the containerships trade. Figure 11 shows that containerships are the major users of 
the canal with usage rates of an average of 7616 ships between 2006 and 2008 or 39 
% of the total ships transiting the Canal between those periods. 
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Figure 11: Container traffic via the Suez Canal between January and May for three consecutive 
years (2007-2009) Source (Suez Canal Authority) 
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In addition, from looking at graphs 12 and 13, the tanker ships and bulk carriers are 
not really witnessing any decline as a comparison with the previous year as they show 
similar trends. However container ships have declined dramatically since January to 
increase in mid march and fall sharply in May. Comparing this trend with the 
previous years, it can be argued that the growth in international trade and demand for 
products and containerisation should instead either lead to an increase in the number 
of ships and tonnage or a sustained growth. However, this is not the case in the 
current economic climate. 
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Figure 12: Tanker Trade via the Suez Canal Figure 13: Bulk trade Via the Suez Canal 
(Source: SCA monthly reports) (Source: SCA monthly reports) 
3.3.4.2 Ships expenditure and the ship-owners decision to transit the Suez Canal 
Other ingredients that affect ship-owners decision to transit the canal are the 
fluctuation of bunker price and the rocketing of insurance premium. These elements 
amplify ships expenditures, which will be passed to charterers who in turn will pass 
the cost to shipper, receivers or consumers. Many ship-owners have either laid up 
their ships because the cost of operating the ships exceeding the profit, or others have 
reduced their turnaround by reducing the number of voyages and relying on the 
economy of scale through using bigger ships such as Mega-containerships with a 
nominal size of 8000 TED. Companies such as Japan's MOL, Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, 
OOCL and MISC decided to reroute their containerships around the Cape of Good 
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Hope in order to avoid high tolls that exceeded $700,000 for a very large 
containerships (Porter and Grinter, 2009). Other large shipping companies such Mearsk 
line; CMA-CGM and the Mediterranean Shipping Company MSC announced that 
they are too diverting their large containerships around Africa. Porter and Grinter 
agree that from an economic perspective and taking in hand the market situation the 
"diversion makes sense because of lower bunker prices that enable lines to save 
money despite burning more fuel on the longer voyage" (Porter and Grinter, 2009). 
From the point of view of ship-owners two options lay ahead, if they use the Suez 
Canal two things will be considered, (1) they need to raise the amount they charges on 
the Canal, hence this will increase freight rates and shippers will pay more. In this 
case the ship-owners will keep sending their ships via the Suez Canal. But, the 
decision to do so lay entirely in the hands of the charterer and the shippers. (2) The 
cost of running the ships and the type of charter are crucial in the decision to transit. 
In case of the time charter and voyage charter, charterers will pay only a lump sum or 
daily hire for the owners. According to the charter party contract BALTIME Time 
Charter "The charterers shall provide and pay for all fuel oil, port charges, pilotages 
(whether compulsory or not), canal steersmen, boatage, lights, tug-assistance, 
consular charges (except those pertaining to the Master, officers, and crew), canal, 
dock and other dues and charges.." (BIMCO, https:/Iwww.bimco.org/, 2001). In some 
reports, the cost of re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope is actually less than the 
total of tolls and insurance paid to transit the Suez from most of the vessels. To make 
things worse, the shipping community including ship-owners and organisations such 
as INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, BIMCO and the International Chamber of 
Shipping have approached the Authority of the Suez Canal in an attempt to convince 
them to reduce the charges imposed on ships. (Porter and Grinter, 2009). These attempts 
have failed to bring any results and currently until the completion of this study the 
tolls have not been changed 
AXS Aphaliner, an information service that tracks the container trade has argued in 
their July 2009 report that 15% of the current container capacity will be inactive by 
October (Economist, 2009). This figure is worsened by Drewry an independent 
maritime Advisor argued that the containers service between Asia and Europe lost 
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about $20 Billions, and ship-owners try to offset this figure by slow steaming to save 
fuel and "opting for the longer and cheaper route round the Cape of Good Hope, 
which avoids hefty fees for using the Suez Canal" (Economist, 2009). 
Another report by the Supply Chain Digest, an online information service about 
Logistics and Supply chain Management identified three main reasons that have taken 
the "once hot sector to absolute pummelling" (SCDigest Editorial Staff, 2009)., 
Firstly the volume of import in containers has decreased by as much as 20.6 % 
between January and June 2009. Secondly this decrease in volume is made worse by 
the fact the ship order book is full and some shipping liners have already ordered 
Mega Containership that can transport more than 10000TEU, these ships will be 
added during the next three coming years to the current capacity. This will lead some 
liners having to pay penalties for cancellations or layoff smaller container ships and 
use the new megaships for service around the Cape of Good benefiting from the 
economy of scale and saving on fuel (SCDigest Editorial Staff, 2009). Thirdly, spot 
rates are weakening. Supply Chain Digest staff indicated that the rental of FLC ships 
has decreased by 80% from $38,500 to only $5700. He added that it costs $ 1400 to 
transport a container between China to Europe; this rate has gone down to merely 
$400, with shipping companies recovering only their costs and aiming for closer 
market recovery. (SCDigest Editorial Staff, 2009). 
To conclude this part, it is very clear that the global recession is hitting hard on the 
shipping industry; this is affecting the Suez Canal Authority and Egypt as mentioned 
that it is their 2nd Source of foreign currency.. 
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3.3.5- Suez Canal and Maritime Piracy: 
Without a week passing by, the shipping industry, governments including security 
experts are raising the level of threats that is facing the safety of vessels transiting 
some major regions knows to be hot spots for piracy and armed robberies such as 
Golf of Aden and coast of Somalia. Nations of the world have known piracy since 
3300 years, where pirates sailed in rowing boats with weapons together with brass 
guns, swivel guns, handguns and swords and where chief pirates dressed in scarlet 
tunics and armours coats. Nowadays, people undertaking these attacks are not 
anymore poor coastal inhabitants banded in groups and attacking individual merchant 
vessels, but they now appear to be sophisticated, organized and more equipped with 
advance technology and armed with heavy machine guns. 22000 ships transit the 
Gulf of Aden every year between Asia and Europe, with the cost of deviating through 
the Suez Canal or going around the Cape of Good Hope adds significant costs and 
delay to consumers and customers. (Ross Kamp in search for pirates, SKY 1, March 
2009). Therefore this area of the sea has been recognized as lucrative target for 
attacks and seizures of vessels and cargos (Image 3). In a report published by the 
Lloyd list, pirates of the 21st century said to "use all the digitals tools to hunt down 
the next victim" (Lloyd Editorial staff, 2009), whereby pirates use similar AIS 
(Automatic Identification Systems) used in merchant ships and VTMS station to 
locate and select ships. 
Image 3: Three major piracy hotspots (Source: Ross Kamp in search for pirates, SKY 1, March 
2009) 
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Piracy is defined by the International Maritime Bureau 1MB; an organisation created 
by the international Chamber of Commerce, as "an act of boarding or attempting to 
board a ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or 
capability to use force in the furtherance of that ad' (Young, 2007:10). Other 
definitions were given by other bodies such as the IMO and the UN. This definition is 
only useful for an operational purpose in order to assess the situation and distinguish 
it from armed robbery or terrorism where the response could be different. 
3. 3.5.1 Current situation ofpirate attacks betweenJanuary andJune 2009 
Merchant ships originated from Asia and the Arab Gulf use the Straits of Bab al 
Mandeb as an entrance to the Red Sea then to the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal 
Authority declared that piracy in not at all a problem to the vessels using the Suez 
Canal. (Wingrove, 2009) In an interview conducted with Abdel Moneim, director of 
Al Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Egypt he told VOA news that "The piracy is 
zero. J mean, because the piracy is now handled by a number of forces, and the 
international trade, when it was going up last year and the year before was not 
affected by that factor" (Yeranian, 2009). Nerveless, monthly reports published by 
the 1MB showed that the presence of the international navy and coast guards in the 
areas of Bad el Mandab and the coast of Oman are not deterring pirates from 
hijacking ships; instead the number of attack dramatically rose. In March 2009, MV 
Sultana was hijacked and seized 50 miles from Bab EI Mandab (Image 2) by pirates 
in the watch by both an American navy ship and the British navy NV 
Northumberland. Both navies could not deter pirates from hijacking the ships fearing 
that any action could lead to unwanted consequences. In a discussion with the NV 
Northumberland Naval force officer, Ross Kemp, concluded that the only time a 
vessel could be saved, is when the navy catch the pirates in the act of seizing the ships 
as once they are onboard the safety of the crew comes first. In a last radio 
transmission with the captain of the MV sultana which was surrounded by 3 
helicopters, pirates ordered both American and British navy ships and helicopters to 
"stay away.... As the ship is on its way to Somalia", and it did go indeed (Ross Kamp in 
search for pirates, SKY 1, munities 30-38, March 2009). 
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Image 4: MV Sultana's Capture (Source: Ross Kamp in search for pirates, SKY 1, March 2009) 
According to a report by the 1MB, attacks also reported to extend beyond Bab el 
Mandab and into the Red Sea, where it could also make ships more vulnerable to 
attacks than in the larger areas of the Gulf of Aden. (ICC -1MB staff, 2009) The 
diagram below illustrates the number of attacks in Africa, noticing that 10% or 14 
attacks have been reported in the Red Sea. 
• Red Sea 
• Gulf of Aden 
• Somalia 
Figure 14: Number of pirates attacks reported in Africa between January 2009 and
 
June 2009 (Source: ICC-1MB staff, 2009).
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To conclude, piracy is growing and spreading to cover the Red Sea, threatening ships 
heading towards the Suez Canal. The next part of this chapter will look at the 
economic impact of the piracy at sea on Suez Canal and international trade. 
3.3.5.2 Economic consequences of the attack in international trade 
The economic consequences of piracy in the gulf Aden goes beyond affecting the 
Egyptian economy and the Suez Canal Authority. Monie indicated in his paper given 
as part of European commission conference held in January 2009 that these incidents 
extend to affect Mediterranean port authority causing a decline in the number of ships 
calling at their ports and loss of cargo for transhipment through Mediterranean hub 
ports such as Aspasia port in Italy. (Monie, 2009) According also De Monie's study, 
the impact also increases the total operating expenditures and decrease carrying 
capacity for regular shipping lines. (Monie, 2009) The table below illustrates the 
difference and the elements involved in the choice of routes and their economic 
viability for charterers. This study was conducted by the US Maritime Administration 
and various bodies in order to show vessel related expenditure as a consequence of 
piracy attacks. 
Table 2: Vessel related expenditures as a consequence of the piracy in the Gulf of
 
Aden, (Source: USA Maritime Administration).
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Another study conducted by the USA Maritime Administration illustrates the real cost 
associated with the transit of the Suez Canal. The findings show that ship-owners 
need to add an average of 155000 USD $ per transit to cover insurance, to pay for the 
licensed guards and other equipments used to deter pirates from boarding the ships 
such as "SONIC DETTEREENT EQUIPEMT" (Appendix 5). In some cases, where 
the transit involves large container ships, it was argued in a research conducted on 
several container shipping companies that SCA receive around $700000 as tolls for 
the transit. 
Due to the limited data that can be gathered to specify the exact amount lost by the 
Suez Canal Authority in the period since September 2008, several studies conducted 
by the 1MB and Lloyd Maritime Intelligence concluded that piracy is contributing by 
up to 20% in the decrease in canal revenue. This decrease is simply because "marine 
insurance premiums for vessels travelling in piracy-prone areas are significantly 
high ...owner and charterer must weigh the risk in this situation" (Nast, 2009). A 
statement made by the spokesman in the SCA to Reuters confirmed that if piracy 
continues at the current rate, it will certainly affect the Canal revenues, and even more 
the future plan to expand and widen it. (Yusri,2008). What this meant is that the 
ongoing project to expand the Canal to accommodate larger containerships and oil 
tankers with a larger beam and deep draft will occur massive spending and the 
reluctance of ship-owners to use the Suez Canal could lead to the failure of the project 
not paying for itself. 
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3.3.5.3 Bab EI Mandab: 
Image 5 Bab EI Mandab Strait 
Bab el-Mandab is largely outside the remit of this study as the SCA have no direct 
influence on the straits, however the author feels it is significant to recognize its 
importance to the global energy trade. The Strait can be considered as one of the vital 
chokepoints between the hom of Africa and the Middle East and it has been used 
since long time as a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian 
Ocean. Exports from the Gulf must pass through Bab el-Mandab before entering the 
Suez Canal and access the SUMED pipeline. According to the EIA, an estimate of 3.3 
million bblld passed by this strait toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, with 
75% of the traffic accounting to 2.1 million bblld, flows northbound. (EIA Staff, 
2008). 
Although Bab el Mandab is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, only 2 miles of its 
width are navigable for both inbound and outbound shipments. Sampson and Gvosdev 
argue that an attack on a tanker ships such as the Sirius Star, a crude super tanker 
hijacked in late 2008, could have a devastating impact that could literality stop all the 
traffic towards the Suez Canal, leading shipping companies to divert around the Cape 
of Good Hope, which in tum will lead to a sharp rise in energy costs (Sampson and 
Gvosdev, 2008). 
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3.4 Conclusion: 
In the literature review chapter, this study assessed the Suez Canal from four different 
aspects. Initially, the author deduces that the administrative aspects can be improved 
if formalities and Canal documentations are better structured. In addition, the Suez 
Canal can improve through close monitoring of their canal agents and their 
subcontractors. Secondly, in term of the operations aspects, the study of Griffiths 
shows that amending the convoy systems could increase the capacity of the canal, 
without making any changes to the physical characteristics of the Canal. Another 
important finding reveals that Suez pilotage is not conforming to international 
standards. In terms of the Global recession, the study focuses on container trade as it 
has been revealed to be the most affected by the global recession and it is affecting the 
Suez Canal turnover. It was argued that the Suez Canal are not encouraging 
containerships companies, instead the rate regime is very strict and several surcharges 
are applied on them compared to other types of vessels who benefit from the SCA 
rebates systems. Maritime piracy is exposed to be a major threat for the Suez Canal as 
pirates are spreading their attacks towards the Red Sea threatening a very busy 
shipping lane. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This research has been engaged in looking at the reasons for the recent decline in ship 
and cargo traffic via the Suez Canal. As previously mentioned, this study investigates 
the critical factors that are contributing to this decline. Reflecting on the objectives of 
this study;(1) to assess the internal efficiency of the Suez Canal Authority, (2)to 
assess the impact of global recession and maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden on the 
SCA, and (3) to critically evaluate ways of enhancing the performance of the Canal. 
This chapter attempts to introduce the findings from the fieldwork I conducted. My 
methods or ways of presenting the data collected from interviews follow a thematic 
analysis approach, which means I am going to present what I found through looking 
at different themes and trying to organise the data accordingly. As for the 
questionnaires, Turkey argued that exploratory data analysis is useful for quantitative 
data analysis by using graphs and diagrams to illustrate and understand, meanwhile 
keeping in mind the research questions and objectives when exploring the collected 
data (Turkey, 1977: 3). As part of this project, I conducted interviews and 
questionnaires with different experts in the field, based in Tunisia and UK. 
In the beginning of this section, the administrative and the operational efficiency of 
the Suez Canal will be examined. In addition, the effect of how their present 
framework of work can affect the Canal users. After the analysis of the mentioned 
section, the critical factors in respect with global recession and pirates attacks in 
Somalia will be analysed sequentially with views from relevant key players 
interviewed in the industry. As different shipping companies have their own 
framework and decision making mechanism making everyone of them unique in their 
opinions. 
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4.2 Interviews results: 
4.2.1 Formalities and Dealing with officials from a Captain's point ofview: 
According to Captain Mohamed the process involving booking a place in the convoy, 
the documentations and payments of tolls are well structured and organized. 
Information is also published online and canal agents usually give reminders and 
updates to all canal users with new regulations coming in place. He added that the 
Suez Canal have synchronised and coordinated all their canal agents with the 
authority and shipping companies through email networks in order to facilitate the 
transfer of documents. During a phone interview with captain Aftav, he confirmed 
what Mohamed claims and he added that the Suez canal Authority have a "very 
effective and well coordinated" administrative process. One of my questions during 
the interview was: "don't you think that emails are not as an effective proper IT 
system that can handle many functions at one time?". Captain Mohamed replied that 
the Canal has 134 agents, these agents deal with more than 300 canal users, therefore 
an IT systems especially designed to deal with paperwork and documentations will 
have to be used by every canal agents and shipping companies. These IT systems will 
be expensive to setup and maintain and require specially trained staff to operate. 
Another question was asked about the certified canal agents working with the Suez 
Canal Authority. Both captains Mohamed and Aftav argued that problems and 
pressure start when they reach the Canal and the convoy was ready to start moving. 
Mohammed indicated that the SCA are not controlling what's going on within the 
Canal or once the vessel reaches the anchoring or waiting areas. He added that as a 
normal day to day practice, several inspections are carried out such as immigrations 
verification, medical inspections and suppliers of amenities for the crew and spare 
parts for ships. These procedures are inevitable and there are "good and not good 
agents". On the one hand, the captain argued that they come onboard with a lot of 
questions and forms to complete which are time consuming and tiring after several 
hours in the sea. Both captains commented on the lack of professionalism in the job as 
70% of officials are 'dishonest' and look for gifts or "bribes". So, as matter of "Suez 
norms" as one of the captains called it, every ship has to have in stock some gifts in 
stock like cigarette packets, wine, or expensive things to please officers and to 
facilitate the transit. On the other hand, Aftav said the transit can be difficult for some 
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and easy for others. It depends how much work your agents have already prepared 
before the ship reaches the Canal. In addition to that the personality of the captain 
plays a role in the transit, especially when the Canal agent knows that it is his first 
transit. 
4.2.2 Ship chandler from a captains' point ofview: 
Ship chandler supplies the crew's food, ships maintenance supplies and spare parts. 
Most of the large shipping companies have their own ship chandler arranged by the 
Canal agents. According to captain Aftav, who worked for large and small shipping 
companies, shipping companies do not trust the Suez ship chandler as their quality of 
service is not good especially when it comes to bunkering with fuel oil as it can be of 
a low quality and can affect the ship engine. Captain Mohammed argued from his 
perception that ship chandlers prefer to deliver at night time, when the crews are 
resting and not much inspections can be made to check the quality of deliveries. He 
added that ship chandlers send their requests via VHF radio disrupting 
communication with the Suez Authority and their shipping companies. A question 
was asked about why the SCA are not regulating ship chandlers in order to ovoid 
many unwanted ship chandlers, Both captains argued that there are real problems 
during the transit and the SCA needs to take dramatic measures in order to inspect 
them regularity and certify the ones that are more reliable. 
4.2.3 Pilotage from a Captain's point ofview: 
Although the Suez Canal is wide and deep, pilots and tug boats are essential for 
transit. The Suez Canal has its own simulation, equipped with advance bridge 
simulators. According to both captains, pilots are not well trained and regulated and 
most of them are Ex-Navy officials with no experience on merchant ships. Captain 
Mohammed argued that most of them do not have much experience in handling large 
vessels and they come on board for and I quote "Show Business". He gave the 
example of a pilot who had ordered the captain a "full astern" in a short distance. This 
has caused the ship to run aground and to up the bank of the Canal causing a major 
electrical failure in the Ismailia. The next day the captain was blamed for the accident. 
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Captain Aftav indicates that the lack of experience is clearly a major problem, but the 
human errors occur and the SCA authority are putting this issue high in their agenda. 
Therefore, I will not consider it as major problems and shipping companies are 
obliged to transit the canal using up to five different pilots in some cases. To finalize 
this part, the interviewed shipping company argued that the captain and the crew are 
paid for their jobs; therefore it is their duties to deal with the issues mentioned above. 
4.2.4 Convoy systems and navigation through the Suez Canal/rom a captain's point 
ofview 
As part of this research, the navigation and convoy systems are categorised under the 
operational aspects of the Suez Canal. According to both captains, the Suez Canal is 
well maintained and equipped with the latest navigation technologies such as advance 
radars and several VTS stations, as well several powerful dredgers which are required 
due to the nature of the sandy canal bed. He added that the Suez Canal has in place 24 
tug boats with bollard pull of between 30 and 40 Tons and 3 with a Ballad pull 
between 100 and 160 Tons. One of my questions with regards to the convoy system 
was 'If the convoy systems were re-structured, would this increase the number of 
ships through the Canal?' The captain indicated again that the current convoy systems 
accommodate between 50 and 70 ships a day, he added the only way to increase this 
number is by increasing the double parts sections of the canal and straightening the 
middle sections. He also added that the waiting time for both southbound and 
northbound could be dramatically reduced to a few hours. However, this project will 
be time consuming as the middle section is a long distance not less than 50 km, and 
secondly the project is very expensive and it will disrupt the traffic. This idea was 
proposed to Captain Mohamed and Captain Zakariah, who agree on the fact that, 
although the project is very costly adding to that a more Traffic Separations Schemes 
(TSS) are required to manage the inward and outward traffic; nevertheless they were 
more optimistic about the idea. They argued that this project could reduce the waiting 
time at each side in Port Said and Suez Port and could double the number of ships 
going through the Canal each day. Captain Zakaria added that the SCA could 
implement this project in phases and during time when the convoys are unproductive. 
He added that increasing the double sections could in some emergency situations help 
the traffic not to be blocked and the other line could be used, so not disrupt the 
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convoys. When both captains were asked if this project would affect liners! They 
indicated that liners are flexible and can easily reschedule their services and the SCA 
authority can publish new regulations online and updates the canal users with the new 
projects months before the start. Another way to increase traffic is to increase transit 
time cycle from 12 hours to 24 hours; this project was proposed to the all 
interviewees. The response was negative as some of them argued that increasing the 
cycle time will increase the number of ships transiting during night time, where 
visibility could be reduced dramatically especially in some parts of the Canal and 
might lead to incidents. In addition, expanding the cycle to 48 hours instead of 24 
hours reduces the resting time for the crews as they will be obliged to transit. 
According to Mr. Sahbani Ben Fathel, who used to be captain and now the managing 
director of one of the ports in Tunisia, when I asked about the extent to which the 
Suez Canal could be improved, he answered that the Suez Canal is one of the old 
waterways that shaped the world's trade, merchants and shipping companies. He 
further pointed out to the fact that the short sea shipping and liners are the highest 
users of the Canal. These companies have been operating since long time and have 
planned their business schedule according to the Suez Convoy Time Systems. He 
added that due to the globalisation phenomenon and the increase in demand for 
product, shippers needs a quick turnaround of their cargo. To further explain his 
point, he argued that in Tunisia, the Office de la Marine Merchants et Port (OMNP) 
are now experiencing problems and slow in traffic, because we are improving and 
deepening some of our ports to accommodate larger containerships and tankers, 
therefore we had major opposition for this project; as this will interrupt the service of 
some liners. This has led some shipping companies to load or discharge their cargos 
in other ports located in the south adding another six hours of transit. The weakness 
of the Suez Canal is that it is prone to lose business if it amends its convoy systems as 
this will dramatically influence its clients' business. At the current stage, Mr Sahbani 
Ben Fathel added that this project is really important to the survival of this canal 
especially that this it is a major contributor to the Egyptian economy. 
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4.2.5 Maritime piracy: 
The issue on piracy has been a recurring theme in the interview and questionnaires 
which point out to the highly international concern on trade and especially via the 
Suez Canal. The experts I interviewed with regard to this issue argued that piracy has 
become not only a regional problem but it is going international, as 60 % of ships 
transiting the Suez Canal belong to the Asia-Europe trade. In an extensive interview I 
conducted with the Managing Director of GMT, Mr S. A, a bulk and container carrier 
in Tunisia from Rades Port and La Goulette Port, Tunisia to Singapore and Indonesia, 
who indicated the fact that piracy is becoming a rather very problematic issue for 
them. Despite that, during the last meeting, his company decided not to divert around 
the Cape of Good Hope, although his ships are more prone to pirates attacks as most 
of them have a very low freeboard "which is the distance between the water and deck 
ofa vessel". Therefore they decided to keep using the Suez Canal and to upgrade their 
ships' security plan by including more stringent anti-piracy measures in order to 
mitigate the risk of pirates' attacks. During the month of April 2009, Mr S.A added, 
the company conducted a general meeting with senior officers and crew and decided 
to include security preparedness, vigilance and watch keeping in the instructions and 
training especially at night and in "blind radar spots". In addition, they have equipped 
their ships with anti-piracy equipments such as hoses that use generators to suck 
seawater and pump out from all the ship side in order to deter pirates from climbing 
on board. The director further pointed out to the fact that the number of vessels being 
hijacked out and in of the Red Sea are increasing and the attacks are spreading 
towards the Suez Canal. Mr S.A added that the piracy is becoming a lucrative 
business in the Red Sea and Southeast Africa led not only by Somali pirates but also 
by pirates from other neighbouring countries. In an interview with Mr Zakaria, an ex­
Ship Captain and senior lecture at Warsach Maritime Academy (United Kingdom), he 
argued that piracy will not be reduced until stringent measures are taken by littoral 
states. He added that piracy will spread rapidly towards the Red Sea, and as long as 
Egypt can be considered the most influential country in the area and it has interest in 
protecting the Suez Canal, therefore the SCA has to encourage the government to 
engage some of the Red Sea states into a regional agreement to improve their ability 
in regulating and policing the areas. 
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4.2. 6 Global recession: 
Because of its commercial sensitivity, the question about the economic slowdown and 
its impact on the Suez Canal was discussed in Chapter 3 and it would be better to get 
the opinion of Suez Canal authority themselves. But as mentioned in the 
methodology, no reply has been received from them. Since then, I have decided to 
look at and understand this issue from a shipping companies standpoint by identifying 
the elements that are influencing the decision of shipping companies to transit the 
Canal or not. 
In a phone interview with Mr Cris David, an Operational Manager, argued that the 
economic slowdown has reduced demand for commodities. Suppliers or buyers have 
become more flexible in terms of delivery schedules as demands on their products 
diminished. He added that the cost of bunker consumption, the daily running costs of 
the vessels and next port dates are very crucial to liners because 40% of the capital 
expenditure is spend on bunker prices. With comparison to 2008 and 2007 trends, the 
prices are much lower and it will be economically viable for containerships to re-route 
around the Cape of Good Hope avoiding heavy Suez surcharge on containership, high 
insurance premium and risk of pirates' attacks. Mr Cris, added that, in this certain 
economic condition, and being late in the convoy, means either shipping companies 
pay a premium rate or an extra 3% to 5% on top of the tolls, resulting in an increased 
expenditure. 
4.2.6.1 Rate regime ofthe Suez Canal: 
Further in the interview conducted with Mr Cris David, Operation Manager in one of 
the UK shipping company, he revealed that the Suez Canal Authority tolls structure is 
not well structured and the rate regime is too complicated, as ship-owners are always 
paying premium rates and surcharge in order to join a later convoy or to ensure quick 
passage and limit their waiting time. He goes "their daily revenue received is 
enormous", and thinks that the administrative aspects of the Suez Canal and the 
current regime of giftslbribes will not be removed unless the SCA raises the pay of 
their staff, especial pilots and officials. In addition, he indicated that one of the main 
reasons why such expansion projects cannot be undergone is because most of the 
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money received from tolls is not used for the Canal development in term of the 
infrastructures around it. Then he gave the example of the Panama Canal and the role 
of privatization ofthe authority running the canal in developing the country, the canal 
infrastructure and attracting foreign investments 
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4.3 Questionnaires Results: 
4.3.1 Introduction: 
One standard questionnaire was sent to twenty shipping companies operating via the 
Suez Canal. This questionnaire attempts to support the finding presented in the 
previous section through interviews. The first part of the questionnaire comprises 
close-ended questions about the administrative efficiency of the Suez Canal in terms 
of their effectiveness of the booking and paperwork process. The second part deals 
with the operational aspects in terms of the efficiency of the convoy systems and 
waiting time. The third part looks at the economic slowdown by assessing the 
perception of shipping companies with regards to tolls and effect of fluctuation of 
bunker prices. The last section looks at the impact of maritime piracy through 
insurance premiums and the fear of ships being hijacked. The sample is limited as 
only a small number of shipping companies (about 25% of the total number) returned 
the completed questionnaire. Most the replies were received from containers shipping 
companies. These questions are presented in graphs and diagrams, which are then 
analysed and interpreted. 
4.3.2. Questions presentation and analysis: 
Question 1: How frequently do you transit the Canal? 
Percentage of shipping companies 
Figure 15: Frequency of the respondents' transit via the Suez Canal 
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The frequency of transit via the Suez Canal was a refresher question; however, this 
result showed that more than 40% of the respondents transit the Suez Canal twice or 
more per week. Hence, shipping companies have frequent contacts with the Suez 
Canal Authority and their contractors. This will enhance the research reliability in 
terms of answers' accuracies. 
4.3.2 AdministrativeAspects: 
Questions 2: Is the process (Booking, regulations, and paperwork, inspections, 
and tolls payment) well structured, formulated and comprehensive? 
_ Strongly agree _ Agree - Disagree _ Strongly Disagree 
0% 
Figure 16: Efficiency of the Suez Canal's formalities 
The pie chart above represents the proportion of the respondents per percentage with 
regards to question number 2, with each proportion representing a variable and is 
represented in different colors. It was expected that the reliability of the SCA process 
is a little lower. Here the results are a lot higher as 40% of respondents claimed that 
they "Strongly Agree" that the process involving the booking of a place in the 
convoy and the paperwork are well structured and formulated. The same share of 
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respondents has accredited "Agree" with regard to efficiency. And it appears that an 
average of only 20% of the respondents ranked "Disagree". To sum up, 80% of 
respondents are generally satisfied with the SCA formalities and paperwork 
procedures. From my observation, the SCA and their canal agents provide an online 
public database illustrating a comprehensive and complete documentation aiming at 
explaining the Suez's paperwork requirements, methods of communication and 
deadline for submission of booking and payments of at each stage. In addition, the 
company informs its existing customers with regular newsletters for the purpose of 
updating with new developments and new changes in policies and regulations. 
However, these findings should be treated with cautions as this only presents a small 
number of the Canal users and the findings might not be generalized as a large sample 
needs to be surveyed in order to confirm this outcome. Despite that comparing the 
perceptions of shore based personnel questioned and onboard captain's interviewed, it 
appears that there is a similarity in opinion, as both samples have given positive credit 
to the SCA administrative systems before reaching the Suez Canal. To note, this 
question explores only the efficiency of the Canal before the transit. Later questions 
will explore the services at the arrival and during the transit. 
Questions 4: What do you think about the toll paid to the SCA, is it worth the 
service? 
A tolls payment to SCA is made before entering the Canal via the Central Bank of 
Egypt. The canal agent calculates the tolls using the vessel's particulars and other 
elements. Below is a brief explanation of the elements that are taken into 
consideration and beneficiaries: 
Elements taken into 
considerations 
Beneficiaries 
1. Mooring and projector charges 
provided by the Mooring and Light 
company 
2. Pilotage due: Dues are 
categorized by (Vessel size, Night or 
Day and Southbound Transit or 
Northbound). 
3. Maritime ministry charges; Rate 
are calculated depending from different 
tonnages 
1. The type of ship: the SCA 
categories in 8 different types (Crude 
Carrier, Petrol Product carrier, Dry 
Bulk, LPG carrier. LNG carrier, other 
chemical and bulk carrier, 
Containerships, General cargo, Ro-Ro 
ships, Vehicle carrier, passenger ships, 
special floating units and others 
vessels.) 
2. The SCNT: Suez Canal Net 
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Tonnage is calculated by the 
classification society and other trade 
organization. 
3. GRT: Gross Tonnage is based on 
the" the module volume of all 
enclosed spaces of the ship"( 
Wikipedia, 2009) 
4. SDR: The Special drawings Right 
created by the IMF, and is based on 
international currencies, which is more 
stable than other international 
currencies. 
5. Draft: The upright distance 
between the waterline and the keel, it 
is compared with the canal depth for 
safety reason. 
6. Beam: the Width of the ship 
7. Laden or Ballast 
8. Gas Free Certificate 
9. Destination: Northbound or 
Southbound 
10. Number of containers on 
weather deck: the SCA applies 
different percentage on the tolls based 
on the number ofTiers above the deck: 
Example: 18% surcharge for 7 Tiers 
4. Port utilization Charges 
5. Port Dues: It includes Port 
Clearance, Overtime Dues, Cleaning 
dues and Fiscal stamps) 
6. Light dues: Only applicable at 
both end of canal 
7. Customs Dues 
8. Immigration dues 
9. Port Police dues 
10. State Security dues 
11. Seamens Club dues 
12. Quarantine Dues 
Table 3: Rate Regime of Suez Canal (Source: 
0% 0% 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
Figure 17: Tolls paid; is it worth the Service? 
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The above chart represents a proportion of the respondents with regards to question 
number 4, with each proportion representing a variable which is in turn represented in 
a different colour. From figure 17, it is found that out of all respondents, 60% or 3 out 
5 have said that they "disagree" as the tolls paid to the SCA is not worth the service. 
The remaining 40% of the shipping companies selected "Agree". All respondents 
have neither "Strongly disagree" nor "Strongly agree". This suggests that most of 
the shipping companies surveyed are not satisfied with the quality of services 
provided by the SCA and their canal agents. As results, the Canal Authority is not 
creating more benefits since the funds received from the Canal are not used to re­
invest in developing and improving the administrative systems. In addition, looking 
back at the dues required for each vessel brought into focus, the complex rate regime 
which is difficult to administer and control. As mentioned above, ten different 
elements are taken into consideration and eleven beneficiaries receive dues for 
providing services before and while the ship is in transit. 
Questions 9: Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman Company, Canal agents, Pilots Company) influence your decision to transit 
the Canal? 
• Strongly agree • Agree • Disagree • Strongly disagree 
0%0% 
Figure 18: the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
influence your decision to transit the Canal 
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This question explores one of reasons that influence some of the shipping companies' 
decision not transit. It is clear from the findings represented in Figure 18, that 60% of 
the respondents have ranked this statement as "Agree". This finding matches the 
previous findings, as it appears that the numerous numbers of contractors and players, 
and the tall hierarchical characteristic of the organisation unable the SCA to 
constantly and effectively regulate and administer its contractors and the people 
involved in the chain of operations. The above pie chart represents the fraction of 
respondents with regards to question number 4, with each proportion representing a 
variable which is in turn represented in a different colour. It was expected that results 
will show a lower trend; however, only 40% have disagreed with this statement. This 
explains that some shipping companies do not really pay attention to details especially 
when it comes to ensuring the port's dates are met. All of the shipping companies are 
container lines and are limited in time and they are ready to pay additional premium 
by joining the end of the convoy instead of waiting for the next day convoy. In time of 
high demand and where spot rates for containers are high, shipping companies would 
ignore quality and focus on increasing the turnaround of their ships. However in low 
market demand, every penny counts, as a result, liners focus on ensuring that they get 
what they pay for. 
Questions 10: How do you feel about this statement: The privatization of the Canal 
will lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and reduction in 
tolls? 
Figure 19: The privatization of the Canal will lead to more regulated and 
controlled services, increase in traffic and reduction in tolls 
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• Corruption of the administration regime. Unfriendly SCA staff 
• Inflexibility in dealing with ship-owners 
3 3 3 
Very 
important! 
2 3 4 5 6 Not 
important at 
all7 
Figure 20: Administrative related questions 
The issue of privatization of the Suez Canal is a complex matter and out of the remit 
of this study. However, the author attempted to get the perception of shipping 
companies on the matters as both questions were designed not only to collect 
statistics, but to understand if the current regime of the Suez Canal as a state 
controlled company has a relation to its poor performance. 
According to the results in figure 19, 60% of the respondents strongly disagree with 
the statement, whereas 20 % only disagree, and 20% agreed with privatization of the 
Canal could solve the issue of poor performance. These results indicate clearly to the 
researcher that the privatization of the Suez Canal is not the solution forward; 
however, respondents amounting to 20 % agreeing with this statement might have 
thought that the possibility of the Egyptian government privatizing the Canal is less 
likely to happen in reality. However a partial- privatization of some of the aspect of 
the Canal will be more reasonable than giving full authority to a private company. 
Both questions 19 and 20 are aiming at the same theme, however they were proposed 
in a different manner in order to see if the respondents have understood the sense. 
Results showed that "corruption of the administrative regime, unfriendly staff and 
inflexibility of the ship-owners" are rated between 6 and 7, which means are "Not 
important at all" to the decisions of the shipping companies transiting the canal. 
In conclusion, the Egyptian government's regime of the SCA is voted to have not 
direct relations to the inefficiency of the administrative aspect of the Canal. In spite of 
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that, and from my perception given the established results, the SCA Authority has to 
focus its effort in developing some sort of regime to increase transparency of 
information and more stringent control regulations over contractors. 
4.3.3 Operational aspects: 
Since, the interviews have shown that the only issue with operational inefficiency of 
the Canal lies in the convoy systems and the physical characteristics of the Canal, the 
author decided to focus the questionnaire on both themes. These questions centre on 
the effectiveness of the convoy systems, the possibility of restructuring the convoy 
and the waiting time. 
Questions 5: What do you think of the convoy systems? 
0% 
• Highly effective 
• Effective 
• Reasonable 
• Not very effective 
Figure 21: Effectiveness of convoy systems 
Shipping companies themselves transiting the Suez Canal do not have a direct contact 
with the Suez Canal compared to captains or crew actually transiting the Canal. 
Therefore, the questions were only asked to get the perception of these companies 
given their long experience in dealing with the Canal, in respect with the waiting time 
and delays experienced and reported during the transit. The surveyed companies were 
asked to rate the factors that may influence their decision in order of importance with 
l(very Important) to 7 (the Least important). The results as was expected, 4 out 5 
respondents have ranked their preferences between 1 and 3, with the waiting factor 
being to them very important for their decision. Exploring the results obtained from 
Figure 21 and 22, a remarkable finding has initially revealed that 60% of the 
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respondents have agreed that the convoy system is effective, 20% claimed that is very 
effective, and 20% of the respondents said that it is reasonable. Therefore, it can be 
considered that 80% of the respondents are satisfied with the systems. However, a 
question was asked with regard to the opinion with the fact that re-structuring the 
Canal could dramatically reduce waiting time and speed the transit. The findings 
illustrated in figure 22, were not encouraging as the author remarked a contradiction 
in opinions, as 40% of respondent strongly agreed with the idea, whereas the same 
proportion has completely rejected the idea. One of the explanations that can be 
understood from the reply is that shipping companies do not prefer the idea of re­
structuring the convoy systems even if it has been proved to increase speed and 
reduce waiting time. These results confirm the interview findings that one of the 
reasons that discourage the SCA from improving the Canal is the possibility of traffic 
disruption, reduction in traffic and increase in waiting time while the work is under 
way. 
Question 6: Do you think the transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re­
structures the convoy system? 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
Figure 22: The transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re-structures the convoy 
system 
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• Not safe to navigate • Long waiting time 
2 2 
2 3Very 
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Figure 23: Operational related questions 
4.3.4 Global recession: 
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Figure 24: Global recession related questions 
Figure 25 presents a summary of results that correspond to three factors which affect 
shipping companies in a low market demand. These Respondents were asked to rate 
the emphasis placed on each elements (Suez canal's high tolls, Fluctuation of bunker 
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prices and Vessel's expenditure via the Suez Canal compared to the Cape of Good 
Hope) based on 1 to 7 scale with (1= very important - 7= Least important). The 
results in the figure above show that three companies rated "1" and two companies 
rated "2". Given this finding, there is no doubt that the Suez Canal Authority has to 
re-adjust its rate regime. Moving on to the second element, the finding shows that all 
the surveyed companies have rated (Vessel's expenditure via the Suez Canal 
compared to the Cape ofGood Hope) between 1 and 3. This shows that apart from the 
canal expensive rate regime, other elements such as insurance premium coupled with 
additional manning cost augmented the cost associated with transiting via the Suez 
Canal against the cost of transiting via the Cape of Good Hope. Finally, only one 
respondent reported too little emphasis that fluctuation in bunker price could affect 
the economic feasibility of the Suez Canal. Given the results, the remains respondents 
reported that this element is substantial to their decision taking into consideration the 
additional capital cost coupled with further operations and voyage cost via the Cape 
of Good Hope. As mentioned before, re-routing around the cape of good could take as 
much as three times the delivery time compared to the Suez Canal in addition some 
shipping companies would have to add more vessels to increase their total turnaround. 
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4.3.5 Maritime Piracy: 
4 
• Fearsof ships hijacked • Increase in insurances premium 
Very 
importantl 
o 
2 3 4 5 6 Not important 
at all7 
Figure 25: Maritime piracy related questions 
In assessing the extent to which piracy could influence the decision of shipping 
companies to transit, the author look at two elements that ship-owners are concerned 
with; the fears of ships being hijacked and the increase in premium insurance. Since 
December 2008, insurance premiums have tripled with new additional insurance types 
emerged covering piracy specifically Kidnap and Ransom Insurance. Respondents 
were asked to rate in order of importance the following elements (Fears of ship 
hijacked and increase in insurance premium) based on 1 to 7 scale with (1= very 
important - 7 = Least important). It is clear from the results retrieved from the 
interviews that piracy is a priority for ship-owners, as most of the interviewees have 
expressed their concern for the safety of their crews, ships and cargos. Nerveless the 
author attempted to get the perception of some containers liners and to strengthen the 
quality of this study. As it was expected, all the respondents claimed that piracy is a 
major concern by rating between (1-3) as shown in figure 26. This result shows 
without doubt that shipping companies are fully aware of the daily dangers that face 
them in transiting the Canal, especially with recent increase of attacks on 
containerships from Stem as it is the lowest part of the ship. In assessing the insurance 
high insurance rates could deter shipping companies from transiting the canal. The 
results shown in figure 26 illustrates that the number of respondents are distributed 
between scales (1 to 4). This explains that insurance premium depends on how many 
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ships the company is operating and how frequent they transit the Canal, and insurance 
cost is always recoverable as ship-owners can always pass the cost by increasing 
freight rates 
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Chapter 5: Discussion: 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to bring both primary and secondary data into the forefront 
discussion. It attempts to evaluate and engage in analysing the results obtained from 
the interviews and questionnaires against the existing literature on the topic. The 
research results have yielded a clear picture from the different stakeholders on the 
current situation of the Suez Canal in terms of its internal efficiency and the impact of 
global recession and maritime piracy on the traffic via the Canal. 
The decline in traffic during the year since 2008 was the trigger of this research, this 
have lead to exploring other areas that are contributing to this decline, a part of the 
current economic slowdown and the global recession, the aims of this study has been 
to identify and critically evaluate ways of enhancing the Suez Canal regime for a 
better performance. 
Because not much research has been undertaken in understanding the ways one of 
most important Canals in the world operates, the researcher found the process of 
collecting data and conducting questionnaires and interviews quite difficult. However 
the end result was quite revealing. Some information that could not unveiled from the 
secondary data such as the administrative part of the canal has been reported in detail 
within the primary data. 
As shown in the diagram next page, the author has categorized the project into fours 
themes, these were discussed separately in both the literature review and the finding. 
However, the discussion chapter will not follow the prescribed order and the author 
fell that there is need for inter-chapter consistency. 
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Internal I External 
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Figure 26: The research internal and external themes 
5.2 Discussing the results: 
5.2.1 Administrative Obstacles and ways ofaddressing them: 
Although in the literature review, scholars have argued that the underlying assumption 
that the internal administrative and operational regime of the Suez Canal influence the 
volume of traffic via the Canal, this relation has been proved to be true after analysing 
the interviews and questionnaires, in the sense that the internal efficiency plays a key 
role in facilitating the movement of ships via the Canal and ensures trade off between 
high tolls and the quality of service. The findings lead the researcher to unveil several 
obstacles that if tackled or improved could put the SCA in a better position. 
The Analysis of the interviews conducted and questionnaires shows that the lack of 
coordination, inspection and monitoring regime of the different parties involved in the 
administrative operations of the Canal after the ships reach the anchoring areas is 
causing an increase in the inefficiency of the quality of the service provided and 
unprofessionalism in the behaviour of some the Suez Contractors or staff. A second 
major issue is the increase in waiting time which was unveiled to be closely related to 
the complex rate regime, numerous documentations and lack of IT systems that could 
coordinate all the parties involved in the operations under one umbrella. From the 
interviews conducted it was revealed that despite the satisfaction of canal users and 
ship masters with the current booking and formalities procedures, and the use of 
emails as an electronic means of communication, there are still opportunities for the 
Canal to ensure a better, efficient and secure exchange of information by introducing 
an optional reservation portal system based on the Electronic Data Collection Systems 
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ECDS that simplifies the process, increases current systems efficiency and groups 
several functions under one system. This system will not be compulsory but optional. 
Customers will have access to this system at all time using computer and internet 
connection. The Suez Canal Reservation Systems will be web-based and with 
practical and easy to use interface. Using this online database, Canal users can access 
the systems to make booking, check their order statues, and add request, check SCA 
News updates and Navigation Rules and request cancellation. Another advantage of 
this system is that it will reduce the interference of Canal users with Suez Contractors. 
Order will be available in the system and the SCA dispatch them to their contractors. 
This system will also link contractors and Canal agents with the Canal users, whereby 
each customer and registered agent under this system will have his own user name 
and password. Suez Canal Reservation System could be initially optional, thus to give 
more flexibility to shipping companies that are not willing to change. 
The implementation process of such project will not cause interruption in the service 
as a trial notice will be published online giving shipping companies a time to test and 
train their staff to use it. This project is not costly and it could be considered one off 
payment, though it will require regular update and maintenance. The software will be 
web-based and canal's users and agents or contractors will use it without any cost 
associated with it. The only limitation to this project is the reluctance of the Suez 
Canal to implement the IT systems and to introduce the new measures to control 
Contractors and Canal agents, as public owned companies are identified in Chapter 3 
to be less efficient and less prone to develop and change than private companies. 
However, full privatization of the Canal would not be the way forward and will not 
solve the issues as it could create economic distortion in the country especially during 
the low market demand. Therefore, semi-privatizing the SCA by sourcing the 
administrative aspect of the Canal to a private company, while maintaining a highly 
standards service of operations. This company will work closely with Canal Agents 
and Contractors and will be an entity certified under the SCA. This will create 
competition and increase challenges to increase quality and satisfy the canal users and 
create in the long terms more jobs, improve infrastructure through profit turned into 
investment for further progress and investment. Also it will, in the long term, improve 
the market value of the Canal as tolls could be increased as long as the quality of 
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service is improved and waiting time is reduced. These strategies will require the SCA 
to reprocess the ways thing are done, this could be implemented with the help of BPR 
Business Process Engineering, which is a method used to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness of the business practice that exists within and across organizations. 
Hannon argues that the key to BPR is for an organization to assess the current 
business processes and identify how they can reprocess these processes for better and 
superior quality. " (Harmon, 2003:24). 
S.2.2The operational obstacles and Ways ofaddressing them: 
The results from the interviews and questionnaires revealed that the SCA's traffic 
management systems and safety regime are effective. The VTMS covers only Port 
Said and Tawfik with radar coverage of 30 km. However, an ongoing project to setup 
four VTMS in Great Bitter Lake and the other three radars in Kantara, Ismailia and 
Geneifa. These radars will improve supervision of the entrance and exit, anchorage 
areas and while vessels are moving. In addition it will monitor the movement of 
beacons and buoys and it will provide real time information about vessel speed, 
separation and position within the convoy. It will also update the authority with 
methodological information. 
Another ongoing project is to widen and deepen the Canal from 62 feet to 66 feet 
allowing 60 % of the tankers, 90 % of bulk carriers and 100% of the containership to 
transit the Canal. According to a news report by Aljazeera Channel conducted with 
the Canal officials, the project is nearly completed (Aljazeera.Net News, zo" July 
2009). 
From the literature review, two projects were identified and assessed; (l) to straighten 
the middle sections by increasing the length of the double parts and (2) to replace the 
24 hours cycle by 48 cycles. These projects were subjected to some shipping 
companies, ship masters and experts in the field for opinion. It was found that 
extending the 24 hours cycle to a 48 hours cycle will dramatically reduce dead time to 
10 %. However it will increase the number of ships transiting during nigh time, which 
makes navigation more hazardous as visibility becomes low. In addition, this project 
will increase the number of ships per convoy reducing separation distance. However 
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this idea was not totally rejected but it was argued to be used as temporary measures 
in order to meet the increase in ships traffic during certain times of the year. 
It can be argued that the idea of increasing the capacity of the Canal will be more 
effective and reasonable if the Suez Canal expands the double part sections of the 
Canal. This project as mentioned in Chapter Three and Four was subjected to the 
same sample as the first project, which has received a wide acceptance. To remind the 
reader, the Suez Canal has 3 double parts sections, and increasing the double parts 
sections will allow more vessels per convoy and increases speed and considerably 
reduces waiting time. In addition providing double lanes will be beneficial in avoiding 
traffic disruption in case of emergency breaks down as the convoy can keep moving 
using the other lane with less delay than a complete blocked waterway. Assessing the 
cost benefit analysis of this project, brought to the author attention that competition 
from the alternative routes such as the Panama Canal with its current expansion 
project and the undergoing study to understand the feasibility of the Northeast passage 
could have a major impact on the economic viability of the Suez Canal for certain 
trades routes. Therefore, the Suez Canal Authority has to study the in-depth the 
practicality of this project in terms of completion time and to ensure that the 
expansion project will not disrupt the current convoy. Another limitation of this 
project is the enormous dredging and maintenance cost associated with the expansion 
as the nature of the Canal is sandy and regular maintenance is required in order to 
sustain the same depth, the Suez Canal regularly uses dredgers. A further limitation 
encompasses the alteration of the current convoy system, as allowing a two- way 
traffic will require the authority to adjust their systems. This will incur a change in 
port dates for some liners; however giving prior notices to shipping companies could 
avoid this from happening. 
There has been a focus here on the limitations of this project, this is because the 
author believes that the current administrative regime will not cope with the increase 
in demand. Because the number of ships transiting the Canal has been increasing 
dramatically since its opening for commercial use boosted with new buildings and 
increase in demands for products and energy, therefore extending the Canal's capacity 
without improving the administrative regime could lead to the failure of the project. 
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The issue of pilotage has also arisen during interviews and questionnaires. The 
majority of respondents have expressed dissatisfaction with the Suez's pilots' 
effectiveness claiming that they are not well trained, unprofessional and do not 
comply with IMO standards for pilots (lMO resolution A.960). During the last 
decade statistics show that only three major accidents occurred. Two accidents due to 
engine failure involving two Liberian registered oil tankers in 2004 and 2006 and the 
Al Samidoon, a Kuwait Oil tanker collided with the bank of the Canal due to the pilot 
misjudgement and excessive change in course causing a 3000 Ton leak of crude oil. 
Another recent Near-miss, where almost two tankers collided when passing side by 
side in the Bitter lake, the captain argued that pilots in both ships misunderstood each 
other, he added that" I would warn masters under pilotage in the Suez Canal to brief 
their Bridge Teams very carefully to monitor the actions ofpilots closely" (MARS 
staff: 2009). 
It is clear both from the literature review and empirical data that despite the effort 
undertaken by the SCA in establishing the Maritime Training and Simulation Centre, 
and claiming to apply the latest advance methods in training, it appears that the Suez 
Canal needs to revise their pilotage regime. From my observation, there is an average 
of 70 ships a day transiting the Canal, where pilots change every two to three hours. 
Thus, one of the assumptions could be due to the high number of pilots needed a day; 
pilots are not getting enough training. Secondly, different ship manoeuvrability and 
excessive work load lead to fatigue which also could be another cause for inefficiency 
of pilots. 
The pilotage issues were not given much attention during this study; nevertheless it 
appears to be it is an alarming issue. The SCA needs to keep this issue high in their 
agenda, as accidents could spell environmental disasters and could block the traffic 
for several days causing loss of revenue and slowing down in international trade. 
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5.2.3 The External obstacles and ways ofaddressing them 
5.2.3.1 Economics slow down mitigations plan 
A financial analyst claimed that the world economy is getting out of the recession, 
however full recovery will take some times (Adam, 2009). China, the third largest 
economy is taking the lead of global recession as its export dropped by 25.7%, mainly 
due to the decrease in its spending power (Yanping, 2009). In addition an analyst 
argued that the world demand for manufactured goods relies on the Chinese 
production capacity with low cost and low margin and North American and European 
importers are looking for alternative overseas markets with a better quality and shorter 
distance to market. With this low performance, adding to that containerized exports 
shipped via the Suez Canal toward North America and Europe are falling sharply. The 
Suez Canal's traffic is expected to slump deeper if measures are not taken by the 
authority to limit their effect. 
Despite the Panama Canal authority is witnessing a decrease too in their traffic, the 
authority have implemented since April 2009, a temporary economic mitigation plan 
by reducing tolls and reducing surcharges and providing more flexibility to shipping 
companies, which lead to unexpected increase in revenue. On the other hand the Suez 
Canal authority has not implemented any changes to its policies, despite several large 
shipping companies approaching them for fees reductions. From the findings and 
literature review, it is clear that the global recession is revealed to be one of the main 
grounds that lead to the dramatic decline in the Suez Canal revenue. These figures 
have worsened since the SCA authority announced traffic statistics for the period of 
June and July of 2009. All the questioned shipping companies have declared that the 
complexity of the rate regime and the high tolls are the main reasons for them to 
divert around of the Cape of Good Hope. It is clear to the reader by now that, the 
Suez Canal needs to put together a plan in order to mitigate the risk of deeper slump 
in revenue. Since the container ship are the most affected by this trade which 
represents 39% of the overall traffic. The Suez Canal has to introduce a temporary 
plan by reducing the tolls charged for container ships through cutting down the 
amount charged on empty containers and reduce fees charged for each tier of 
containers. A discount could also be applied to tankers and bulk carriers. Another 
temporary measure is to give flexibility to ship-owners by temporarily suspending or 
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reducing fees of the 3 and 5 percentage surcharges on top of the tolls for late arrival, 
as well as for cancellation. A long term project will be to revise and restructure the fee 
regime and rebates systems. The rebates system gives discount to certain types of 
ships such as LNG carriers and Long Haul voyages. A future plan is to include other 
types of ships into the rebates systems. The global recession has been battering all the 
economies and businesses around the world, the only thing that the Suez Canal can do 
to reduce the effect of it, is to re-think their strategies and to implement temporary 
measures, so to ovoid more revenue losses. 
S.2.3.23Maritime Piracy mitigation Plan 
Although in the literature review, it has been argued by the SCA that piracy was 
considered as not a major threat to the Suez Canal, Chapter 4 of this study did not 
support these claims made by authority itself. Scholars have also pointed out to the 
gravity of the situation as the research conducted with regard to the consequences of 
transiting the Suez Canal or diverting via the Cape of Good Hope taking in hand the 
additional cost required by the insurance, ship protection and other additional 
operational cost for a longer voyage, shows that this matter becomes high priority in 
every shipping company. 
The empirical field study conducted through interviews and questionnaires generated 
more insight into the current practice of some shipping companies. The results 
revealed in the findings supported the literature review. Interpretation of the findings, 
leads the author to the conclusion that piracy is spreading towards the Red Sea. This 
stretch of water is smaller than the Gulf of Aden; the current international effort could 
not cover Bab EI Mandab, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Up to the time of 
completing this research, all the respondents and interviewees have expressed that 
increase in pirates attacks in Gulf of Aden and Red Sea are compelling shipping 
companies to add additional costs in term of insurance premium and anti-piracy 
equipments. Despite that part of the costs are recoverable by balancing spending 
through lower banker prices and increase in freight rates, the fears for the safety of the 
crews and cargos are becoming an issue of concern, as hijacked ships could stay in the 
captivity ofpirated for long time until a ransom is paid. 
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Piracy in South East Asia has been dramatically reduced with the idea of establishing 
a regional agreement between countries in the areas. This agreement is based on share 
operations in term of pirate's arrest, investigation and the provision of Anti-Piracy 
regime. Few months after the implementation of this code, pirate attacks started to 
diminish dramatically reaching few attacks in 2008 according to some sources. 
Theoretical work showed that despite the increase in the presence of the international 
naval forces in the Gulf of Aden, Bad EI Mandab and the Red Sea, and the established 
Agreement (Djibouti code of Conduct) in January 2009, which was signed by nine 
countries, pirates' attacks are still in the increase. This could be due to the fact that not 
many countries have signed up for the agreement including Egypt. Secondly, these 
countries do not have the expertise and the Know-how in combating piracy. Another 
main reason is the continuous instability in Somalia, where many attempts have been 
carried out since 1991 to reform a proper government. Therefore, from an 
international perspective, piracy is only a symptom of a larger security and corruption 
problems in Somalia, therefore reforming the government will be the best solution. 
However, reforming a government is a long term plan that might take several years to 
bring results which shipping companies and SCA cannot afford. Hence, combating 
piracy at sea will be the only solution in order to protect seaborne trade. 
As mentioned before, several international agreements have been undertaken in order 
to bring several countries to the Red Sea on one table, however, lack of experience in 
combating and not well equipped coast guards, showed that more needs to be done. 
Egypt needs to set up and develop more concrete measures with the collaboration of 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other neighbouring states, and approach some of the South 
East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore for technical and 
experience collaboration. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter identified several obstacles through the assessment of internal efficiency 
of the SCA and the impact of economic slowdown and maritime piracy on the traffic 
via the Suez Canal. Then a set of recommendations have been identified and assessed 
against several criteria. The last chapter of this study will conclude this research and 
summarise the set of recommendations. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
 
6.1 Conclusion: 
This research has attempted to assess the economic viability of the Suez Canal 
through looking at internal and external dynamics that might be influencing the 
current fall in ships' and cargo traffic via the Canal. From the field work conducted, it 
has become clear that the accumulation of several administrative and operational 
inefficiency of the Suez Canal Authority coupled with the slowdown in international 
trade and the upsurge in maritime piracy in the gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, have 
aided the sharp slump in revenues amounting to 22%. 
This study has achieved it aims by investigating the economic viability of the Suez 
Canal, which resulted in the fact that the Suez Canal is gradually losing its 
attractiveness as a cost effective solution for shipping companies trading between 
Europe and Asia. Despite the limitation in locating secondary data, and the few 
number of respondents on questionnaires, the objectives set in this study were all 
achieved. 
The researcher has categorized the regime of the SCA into two parts, the 
administrative aspects and the operational aspects. Both aspects have been researched 
and subcategories were identified and assessed. The results obtained from the 
empirical data, have showed that the administrative regime of the SCA can be 
summarized in pre-arrival and after-arrival formalities, booking procedures, toll 
payments and assignments of contractors and canal agents and handing the transit 
requirements such as tug boat companies, light search company and ship chandlers. 
Despite the positive credit given to some of the aspects of these administrative 
elements, it is clear by now from chapter 4 (Results) and Chapter 5 (Discussion) that 
the canal users are encountering some administrative issues before and after the 
arrival of ships in the waiting areas or the anchorage in both Port Said and Port Suez. 
Analyzing these issues has revealed that there is a scarcity of coordination and 
unregulated contractors that are putting pressure on ships' crew and delaying the 
transits. From pre-arrival perspectives, advance communication technology could 
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allow achieving a high level of performance reducing paperwork, Increase 
transparency and enhance the overall canal administrative procedures. 
It could be also argued that SCA are aware of the technologies and practice used in 
other Canals such as the Panama Canal Reservation system, however Chapter 3 ( 
Literature Review) suggests that the nature of the SCA (a state owned company) is the 
reason for their reluctance in developing and upgrading their business process. 
However the idea of privatizing the SCA was identified not to be the way forward. 
Yet privatizing certain services of the canal could be of great benefit. This is not 
saying that the current system or regime is not performing at all and needs to be 
completely discarded. It appears from Chapter 4, that new systems could be setup in 
place while retaining both systems the new and the old, to allow for more flexibility 
for shipping companies that are not ready for a change. 
Four entities have been used in this study to assess the overall efficiency of the 
operational regime of the Suez Canal, the pilotage, convoy systems and the Aid to 
Navigation AtN in the Canal. It appears from Chapter 4, that only pilotage have 
identified as an issues, however current physical characteristics of the canal are 
identified to be obstacles for further development and the potential increase in traffic. 
In terms of AtN, empirical data have not revealed any inefficiency, nevertheless, the 
SCA needs to continuously upgrade their systems in order to meet new technological 
developments. 
As for the assessment of the impact of external forces on the decline in the ships' 
traffic, the unpredictable current decrease in international trade is certainly the major 
origin for this decline. The upsurge in piracy in the Gulf of Aden stretching toward 
the Red Sea can be also suggested to be the second most important factor affecting the 
number of ships willing to transit the Suez Canal. It is apparently clear that these 
external factors are beyond the control of the Suez Canal Authority, as economies all 
over the world are experiencing decline. Businesses do survive and maintain their 
profit; it is a question if the business is flexible enough from a strategic and resources 
perspective to be able to adjust to survive the crunch while aiming at keeping on 
benefiting their customers. 
It can be concluded that there are enormous opportunities for the Suez Canal to 
improve. The decline in traffic in the Suez Canal could not be directly linked to its 
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mentioned administrative and operations inefficiencies. However global recession 
and maritime piracy are found to be the direct cause for the decline in SCA revenues. 
Nevertheless, increased flexibility in dealing with customers on the one hand and 
widening and increasing the double part sections of the Canal on the other hand could 
have had reduced the impact of low market demand and piracy in Somalia. 
6.2 Recommendations: 
Temporary remedial actions to solve the problems: 
1.	 Allowing for a temporary discount on tolls for containerships and introduce a 
temporary rebates systems for containership carrying less than certain 
containers as well as on empty containers. 
2.	 Give more flexibility to shipping companies by reducing or suspending late 
arrival charges of 3% and 5%, as well as the cancelation fees. 
3.	 SCA needs to put pressure on the Egyptian government to develop a more 
concrete piracy reduction plan with their neighbouring states and in 
conjunction with South East Asian countries especially Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. 
Long term remedial actions 
4.	 Introduce the Suez Canal Reservation systems SCRS, a web-based systems 
that will handle all the administrative procedures. While allowing for 
flexibility by implementing the new IT while maintaining the current 
systems 
5.	 Introduce a new body with the SCA that exercises regular inspections and 
monitoring of the different external entities handling the day to day canal 
operations 
6.	 Revise the pilotage regime by introducing more stringent regulations on 
pilotage's training and periodical refresher courses. 
7.	 Dredging and straightening the middle section of the canal between 
allowing for two way lanes and enhancing safety reduction. 
8.	 Re-structure the convoy systems to meet the expected increase in ships 
traffic after dredging the Canal. 
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6.3 Limitation of the project and further research: 
This dissertation has brought to light important findings on the current and future 
economic viability of the Suez Canal. Carol M. Roberts argued that limitations in any 
dissertation are those aspects that are beyond the control of the researcher, and part of 
the ethics of writing projects is to honestly state the limitations so the reader could 
give a better judgement on the results and outcomes (Roberts, 2004: 147). Like every 
other research work, this study has its own limitations. The main limitation is the 
relatively small sample gained from the fieldwork. Five out Twenty shipping 
companies have responded to the questionnaires sent to them. This affects 
generalizing the findings on large beneficiaries of the Suez Canal. 
Also, the researcher's continuous attempts to contact the SCA have failed. As 
interviews with some of the Canal's officials would have given a greater 
understanding of their regime and which would have taken my research into deeper 
assessment and more accurate results. 
Another limitation is the lack of up-to date journals and academic published material 
on the operations efficiency of the Suez Canal. 
This study was partly engaged in assessing the two evolving themes: the economic 
conditions and the maritime piracy, therefore data and statistics used to support this 
work are subject to change. Further research in this area should be informed by future 
published material, official papers and broader scopes of looking at this problem to 
come up with more reliable results. Securing the feedback of the SCA in terms of in­
depth information about the strength and weakness of the administrative and 
operational aspects of the Canal, and covering a large number of shipping companies 
as part of wider survey study, will provide more accurate results and propose better 
strategies for re-processing the way procedures are taken without interrupting the 
traffic of ships. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Saving distance via the Suez Canal 
D Saving in distance via SC 
The geographical position of the Suez Canal makes it the shortest route between East and West a~ 
compared '(..lith the Cape of Good Hope. The Canal route achieves saving in distance between the ports 
north and south of the Canal, the matter that is translated into other saving in time, fuel consumptior 
and ship operating costs as shown in the table below: 
About 10 % of the world seaborne trade passed through the Suez Canal in 2007. 
~ r 
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Ras Tanura Constanza 4144 12094 7950 66 
Lavera 4684 10783 6099 57 
Rotterdam 6436 11 169 4733 42 
New York 8281 11794 3513 30 
Jeddah Piraeus 1320 11207 9887 88 
Rotterdam 6337 10743 4406 41 
Tokyo Rotterdam 11192 14507 3315 23 
Singapore Rotterdam 8288 11 755 3647 29 
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Appendix 3: Suez Canal Authority Maritime Simulator 
o Maritime Silnulator 
DUI-ing ptlobng In a narrO"N channell' or a canal, 
human errors may yield to ship's grounding. or 
collision due to inexperience, careless.,. or a delay in 
talrjng into account tr,e effects of natural forces such 
as wind and currents. the forces of bank effects and 
shallow water affecti. >g ship's maneuver. 
'n,e pilot has to deal ,"ith these hydrodynamic forces 
that affect his "essel through the different 
navigational areas of the Canal. th,S can be done by 
adjusting their impact on the ship by adjusting the 
speed and distance c.f hIS vessel .• either to the bank, 
or to the shallo\N V\latl~r.
 
Forces of- narure, 'jI\'jr'ld and currents, the pilot must
 
lear'n to "ecognize them and work '",ith them so that his vessel is not affected negatively by them. 
All thes:e forces and conditions are present in the Sue'z Canal in addi1)on to e'lit the other operational
 
characterisbcs and ,"equirements of the Canal.
 
Good ptlo'bng reqUires both Judgrnent and expenence because pilotIng is a constant process of analYSIS
 
and control of '.lanable force.s and conditions,. a deasion-rnaki''''lg and action process aU the v....,a'~· through.
 
V,then maneuvering a vessel in the Canal. the pilot does not have the benefit of friction, and brakes, so 
he must maintain an eqUilibrium of motion and forces, in order to be able to control his vessel. 
As the international trend in training runs by simulation, Suez Canal Authority established the "Maritime 
Training and Simulation Center~ to be one of the greatest centers spedal zed in the field of training pilots 
in U,e rY1iddle East applying the ad'y'anced methods in pf'actical training ana educational pilotage courses. 
CJne of the main objectives of this center is to train Suez Canal pilots to gcun .....aluable and superior 
expenences In d ...e field of pHotage under rnanv conditions, in order to t,"ansit sa'fely the Canal to aVOId 
colhsion and grounding in all envlronrnents instead of being directed to anchor, that were not possible 
before, thus keeping the Canal open all the time for ships transit. 
f'1arn C .... ter·s <>bje<:1:Jves: 
• Training of S.C.A TVpical SilTlulator e.ridge
Pilots on the main 
maneuvers for 
transibng safely
 
the Canal ror
 
dIfferent ship's 
tonnage and 
draughts up to 62
 
feet for time
 
being and 72. feet
 
In the future.
 
Training the Pilots
 
in order to be able
 
• 
to control his 
vessel on
 
dlf'ferent weather condItions espeCJally ,n nil visibIlity. fog, sandstorrn. and fi.J1I darkness.
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Appendix 4: Suez Canal Authority Research Centre 
D Research Center 
Suez Canal Authority Researdl Center (SCRC)­
established in Isrr ailia in 1960 - is speciallzed in 
conducting researches, technical studies and 
consultancy works in the fields of design and 
development of navigation canals, planning of ports 
and harbors and :lesign of marine structures and 
shore protection v-orks, It also conducts studies in 
the fields of soil mechanics, testing of materials, and 
quality control. 
Hydraulics lab 
Physical r-1ooeling 
SCRe's model testing faoltnes serve SCA and 
customers in the fields of port, coastal and 
hydrauks engineering. It indudes: 
•	 Planning and design of ports and marine
 
fadlities.
 
•	 Breakwater stability testing. 
•	 Shore protection ·Norks. 
Facihties 
•	 Wave basin for regular and irregular waves. 
•	 'Nave flume (40 x 1. Srn, with max. water
 
depth O. Sm).
 
•	 A canal research basin used for performing
 
studies related to navigation in SC such as:
 
Q	 Design of canal cross sections, the optimum ship speed in the canal, stopping 
distances required bevNeen ships, effect of vessels off-track from the canal 
centerline, and navigation dangers analysis in the canal. 
o	 stud..... the hydraulic phenomena accompanying passing of ships in the canal. 
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Appendix 5: Additional cost associated per transit via the Suez Canal 
ADDITIONAL COSTS PER TRANSIT VIA SUEZ
 
AS ACONSEQUENCE OF THE PIRACY RISK IN
 
GULF OF ADEN
 
Source: USA Maritime Administration and various press articles
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Appendix 6: Suez Canal Authority VTMS 
o Vessel Traffic Management System{VTMS) 
The Sdentific development accomplished by :,CA in seruring the 
safety of transiting ships through the suez cailal. 
With a view to sa"1..lring the highest stantards of safety to 
vessels passing through the Canal, SCA stepped forward to 
execute a giant project to upgrade VTMS ir order to keep up 
with the latest technological developme rts. The project 
conforms with the international regulations stipulated by the 
International Maritime organization (11'10) con:erning the system 
of traffic in navigational channels, 
Targets:: 
•	 Increasing the standards of safety of vessels tranSIting the canal through a radar network 
covering and monitoring all vessels while arriving at the approaches or ports and while transiting 
the Canal, 
•	 Radar surveillance covering an area of 30 kmruort-Said and Port Tewfik, snd that gives an 
automatic announcement of arrival time of aU v 1.#11 getting into the waiting ar~a, 
•	 Adopting simulating systems of the Canal traffic by lIlIIthe number of vesses in waiting areas 
( Ports, lakes, by-passes ) and weather conditions in programming the altenative designs for 
next day convoys 'deal Transit Pattern', 
•	 Monitoring aU the vessels transiting the Canal to calculate average speed, seoaration distance, 
passage time at signal stations and to plot the real transit pattern, 
•	 Consolidating the trust of our dients, the International Chamber of Shippng and the world 
maritime organizations in the safety of transit and the outstanding performance of the Suez 
Canal Authority. 
•	 Partidpating in environment protection by decreasing the number of acddents in the Canal and 
dealing with them in the proper way in case they occur, 
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Appendix 7: Questionnaires & Interviews: 
Interview Company Position Duration Date Contact 
Name 
Main theme 
covered 
Personnel 
interview 
GMT 1h .55 mn 15/07/ 
2009 
Captain M.A Operations, 
Administrative 
and technical 
aspect, piracy 
Personnel 
interview 
GMT General 
Manager 
45 min 
16/07/ 
2009 
Mr. Bousrih 
Saleh 
Maritime 
piracy, 
Administrative 
and Global 
recession 
Phone Operational 15 min 03/08/ Mr Cris Administrative 
Interview manager 2009 David aspects of the 
Suez canal 
Personnel 
Interview 
OMNP 
Office de la 
Marie 
Marchants 
et des Ports 
Director 30Min 14/07/ 
2009 
Captain. Ben 
Fathel 
Sahbani 
Maritime 
piracy and 
global 
recession, 
Transshipment 
s it effect on 
inbound 
shipping 
Personnel 
interview 
30min 01/07/ 
2009 
Captain 
Aftav 
Piracy and 
Administrative 
and operations 
aspect of the 
Suez canal 
Personnel 
interview 
Warsach 
Maritime 
35min 14/08/ 
2009 
Captain 
Zakaria 
Piracy and 
Administrative 
Academy and operations 
aspect of the 
Suez canal 
Questionnaire Company Contact 
name 
Date Sent Date 
Received 
Statue 
No response 
No response 
1 Hapag Lloyd Managing 
Director 
31/07/200 
9 
2 China Operational 31/07/200 
Shipping Manager 9 
No response 3 Hamburg Ann Jackson 31/07/200 
Sud 9 
No response 4 Ever Green Operational 
Manager 
31/07/200 
9 
5 GMT S.A 01/08/200 03/08/20 Received complete 
9 09 
No response 
No response 
6 Gear Bulk 31/07/200 
9 
7 Maersk Line 
london 
Sala 31/07/200 
9 
76 
8 NYK Line Ruppert 01/08/200 I Received complete 
SHanhs 9 
9 Happag Commercial 31/07/200 No response 
Lloyd manager 9 
10 Msc Mark 31/07/200 No response 
Hasting 9 
11 Coscon Jill 31/07/200 No response 
Container 9 
line 
Front Line Jens Chr 31/07/200 No response 
9 
12 PIL Operation 05/08/200 No response 
department 9 
12 GACWorld Managing 01/08/200 No response 
Director 9 
13 APL Europe Commercial 31/07/200 No response 
Manager 9 
14 Mol Line Anthony 31/07/200 No response 
Shayler 9 
15 Sloman Hazem 05/08/200 Received completed 
Neptune Hadidi 9 
16 Hyundai Jay 31/07/200 No response 
Shipping 9 
18 Cris David 31/07/200 Received completed 
9 
20 Davinder 01/08/200 Received completed 
9 
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Appendix 8: Sample Questionnaire 
Bilel Hadidi (Mr) 
MSc in International Maritime Studies­
Ship and Shipping Management 
Southampton Solent University 
Tel: +44 (0)78446681114 
Email: bilelhadidi@yahoo.co.uk 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Topic: An investigation into the current and future economic 
viability of the Suez Canal 
This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting for my Masters 
dissertation. All data will be solely used for academic purposes and will not be passed 
on to any commercial or other third parties. 
Please fill in the questionnaire by ticking the right box (*) 
Personal information: 
Name: . 
Organisation: . 
Position: . 
Address: . 
1. How often do you think your company's ships transit the Suez Canal? 
D Once a week Twice or more a week DDOnce every two weeks Once a month D 
2. What do you think about the request/reply time in order to book place in 
the convoy 
78 
D Very Efficient D Reasonably good D Average D Poor 
3.	 Is the process (Booking, regulations, paperwork, inspections, tolls
 
payment) well structured, formulated and comprehensive?
 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
4.	 What do you think about the assistance provided by the canal agents to 
Captains before and during the transit? 
Highly effective Effective Reasonable Not very effective 
D D D D 
5.	 What do you think about the Toll paid to the SCA, is it worth the service? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
6.	 What do you think of the convoy systems: 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D D D D 
7.	 Do you think the transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re-structures 
the convoy system? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
8.	 Do you receive negative complain from masters about the inefficiency of 
the Suez Canal 
All the time Some times not many not at all 
D D D D 
9.	 Can you please list up to four type of complains you have received from 
your masters or crew in the last two years with regard to service provided 
by the Suez Canal Authority 
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Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman company, canal agents, Pilots, influence your decision to transit the 
Canal? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
10. How do you feel about this statement? The privization of the canal will 
lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and 
reduction in tolls. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
11. Please rank the factors in this table in order of importance with regard to 
the way they may influence your company's decision not to transit. 
Number 1 for the most important factor. If a factor has no importance at 
all, please leave blank. 
Factors Ranks
 
Suez Canal's high tolls
 
Fears of ships hijacked
 
Increase in Bunker prices
 
Increase in insurances premium
 
Long waiting time
 
Not safe to navigate
 
Inflexibility in dealing with ship-owners
 
Unfriendly SCA staff
 
Corruption of the administration regime
 
Vessel expenditure via the Suez canal compared to the
 
Cape of Good Hope in the current economic conditions
 
12. An ongoing project is being undertaken to expand the Panama Canal by 
including a third lock and wider canal for large container vessels to 
accommodate Suezmax, taking some trade patterns from the Suez canal 
to the Panama Canal. Do you think that the achievement of this project 
will have an influence on your decision to keep sending your ships via the 
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I 
Suez Canal toward North East America (Please answer this question, if 
you have a service to North East America? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
Please add any additional comments in the space below: 
Many thanks for your time and kind support. 
Bilel Hadidi 
Please N.B 
If you're sending the questionnaire by post. Kindly post it to: 
Bilel Hadidi 
35 Hartington road, Southampton, 
S0140EW 
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Appendix 9: Sample from Returned Questionnaires: 
Bilel Hadidi (Mr) 
MSc in International Maritime Studies­
Ship and Shipping Management 
Southampton Solent University 
Tel: +44 (0)78446681114 
Email: bilelhadidi@yahoo.co.uk 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Sloman Neptune
 
Topic: An investigation into the current and future economic
 
Viability of the SuezCanal
 
This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting for my Masters 
dissertation. All data will be solely used for academic purposes and will not be passed 
on to any commercial or other third parties. 
Please fill in the questionnaire by ticking the right box (*) 
Personal information: 
Name: .H. H .. 
Position: .. 
Address: . 
1. How often do you think your company's ships transit the Suez Canal? 
D Twice or more a week D Once a week 
• Once every two weeks Once a month D 
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2.	 What do you think about the request/reply time in order to book place in 
the convoy 
D Very Efficient • Reasonably good D Average D Poor 
3.	 Is the process (Booking, regulations, and paper-works, inspections, and 
tolls payment) well structured, formulated and comprehensive? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D	 D D• 
4.	 What do you think about the Toll paid to the SCA, is it worth the service? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D	 D•5.	 What do you think of the convoy systems: 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D D D •6.	 Do you think the transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re-structures 
the convoy system? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D• 
7.	 Do you receive negative complain from masters about the inefficiency of 
the Suez Canal 
All the time Some times not many not at all 
D D	 D• 
8.	 Can you please list up to four type of complains you have received from 
your masters or crew in the last two years with regard to service provided 
by the Suez Canal Authority 
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... fear of ships hijacked high tolls of the Suez 
canal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . long waiting time 
Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman company, canal agents, Pilots, influence your decision to transit the 
Canal? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D•9.	 How do you feel about this statement? The privization of the canal will 
lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and 
reduction in tolls. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D•10. Please rank the factors in this table in order of importance with regard to 
the way they may influence your company's decision not to transit. 
Number 1 for the most important factor and the number 7 for the least 
attractive. 
Factors Ranks 
Suez Canal's high tolls 1 
Fears of ships hijacked 1 
Increase in Bunker prices 3 
Increase in insurances premium 1 
Long waiting time 5 
Not safe to navigate 3 
Inflexibility in dealing with ship-owners 7 
Unfriendly SCA staff 7 
Corruption of the administration regime 7 
Vessel expenditure via the Suez canal compared to the 
Cape of Good Hope in the current economic conditions 
6 
Please add any additional comments in the space below: 
84 
The Suez Canal has to be expanded to decrease waiting time for ships coming from 
the north and the south side 
Ship-owners have the possibility to avoid high tolls of the Suez Canal by offering 
their own crew training courses how to transit the Suez Canal 
Many thanks for your time and kind support. 
Bilel Hadidi 
Please N.B 
If you're sending the questionnaire by post. Kindly post it to: 
Bilel Hadidi 
35 Hartington roads, Southampton, 
S0140EW 
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Bilel Hadidi (Mr) 
MSc in International Maritime Studies­
Ship and Shipping Management 
Southampton Solent University 
Tel: +44 (0)78446681114 
Email: bilelhadidi@yahoo.co.uk 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Worldwide Shipping & Logistic 
Topic: An investigation into the current and future economic
 
Viability of the SuezCanal
 
This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting for my Masters 
dissertation. All data will be solely used for academic purposes and will not be passed 
on to any commercial or other third parties. 
Please fill in the questionnaire by ticking the right box (*) 
Personal information:
 
Name: ..Davinder Sharma ..
 
Organisation:..Dole Fresh Fruit
 
Carrier .
 
Position: ..Second Assistant
 
Engineer .
 
13. How many times did you transit the Suez canal 
D
 two times
 Donee 
more than three D Three [Z] 
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14. How stressful it is to transit the canal, please rate (with 1 meaning very 
stressful to 10 meaning not stressful at all) Highlight your answers. 
1... 2... 3 ... 4 ....5 ....6 .....7 .....8....9 ... .10 
1.	 What do you think about the request/reply time in order to book place in 
the convoy 
D Very Efficient c=J Reasonably good D Average D Poor 
2.	 Is the process (Booking, regulations, paperwork, inspections, tolls
 
payment) is well structured, formulated and comprehensive?
 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly,

DiSEJ
 D D D D 
3.	 What do you think about assistance provided by Canal agents to Captains 
before and during the transit? 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D D r D 
4.	 What do you think about the Toll paid to the SCA, is it worth the service? 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly, 
DiSO r D D D 
5.	 What do you think of the convoy systems: 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D LJ D D 
6.	 Do you think the transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re-structures 
the convoy system? 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly, 
DiSEJ D D D D 
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7. What do you think of the Navigation rules required by the Suez canal 
authority 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D EJ D D
 
8.	 Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman company, canal agents, Pilots, Search light company influence 
your decision to transit the Canal? 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly,
DiSO CJ D D D 
9.	 How do you feel about this statement? The privization of the canal will 
lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and 
reduction in tolls. 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly, 
DiSO CJ D D D 
10. Rank the elements in the table in order of importance with regard to the 
factors that influence shipping companyies decision not to transit. 
Number the most important 1, the next 2 and so on. If a factor has no 
importance at all, please leave blank. 
Elements Ranks 
Suez canal's high tolls 2 
Fears of ships hijacked 4 
Increase in Bunker prices 4 
Increase in insurances 
Premium 
2 
Long waiting time 1 
Not safe to navigate 5 
inflexibility in dealing with 
ship-owners 
6 
Unfriendly SeA staff 6 
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The Corruptness of the 
administration regime 
6 
Not economical to navigate 3 
11. An ongoing project is being undertaken to expand the panama canal by 
including a third lock and wider canal for large container vessel to 
accommodate suezmax, Taking some trade patterns from the Suez canal 
to the Panama canal, do you think that the achievement of this project 
will have an influence on the decision of ship-owners to keep sending 
their ships via the Suez canal toward North America? 
Agree Strongly Agree slightly Agree nor disagree, Disagree Slightly,DiSO CJ D D D 
Thank you for answering these questions. 
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Bilel Hadidi (Mr) 
MSc in International Maritime Studies­
Ship and Shipping Management 
Southampton Solent University 
Tel: +44 (0)78446681114 
Email: bilelhadidi@yahoo.co.uk 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Topic: An investigation into the current and future economic 
viability of the SuezCanal 
This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting for my Masters 
dissertation. All data will be solely used for academic purposes and will not be passed 
on to any commercial or other third parties. 
Please fill in the questionnaire by ticking the right box (*) 
Personal information: 
Name: S.A .. 
Organisation: ..GMT . 
Position: . 
Address: . 
1. How often do you think your company's ships transit the Suez Canal? 
D Once a week Twice or more a week D
D
 Once every two weeks Once a month {*}D
 
2.	 What do you think about the request/reply time in order to book place in 
the convoy 
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Very Efficient (*) reasonably good Average Poor 
D	 D D D
 
3.	 Is the process (Booking, regulations, paperwork, inspections, tolls
 
payment) well structured, formulated and comprehensive?
 
Strongly agree (*) Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
4.	 0 do you thinDt the a"i,taOoVided hy Do. agents to 
Captains before and during the transit? 
Highly effective Effective Reasonable (*) Not very effective 
5. Ot do you tb:Jahout the TOO to the seQworth the service? 
Strongly agree Agree (*) Disagree, Strongly disagree 
6. 0 do you thinDe convoy,yD D 
Highly effective, Effective, (*) reasonable Not very effective 
7. Pon think tkJn'it could J.a,.1r, ifthe suL caL. re-structures 
the convoy system? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, (*) Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
8.	 Do you receive negative complain from masters about the inefficiency of 
the Suez Canal 
All the time Some times not many (*) not at all 
9.	 OyOU please .J::Jo four type i. coip.ain, you h~:teived from 
your masters or crew in the last two years with regard to service provided 
by the Suez Canal Authority 
...Pilots are not very experienced 
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Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman company, canal agents, Pilots, influence your decision to transit the 
Canal? 
Strongly agree Agree(*) Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D D D 
10. How do you feel about this statement? The privization of the canal will 
lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and 
reduction in tolls. 
Strongly agree Agree(*) Disagree, Strongly disagree 
11. 0 rank the faDn this table DerofimPoDith regard to 
the way they may influence your company's decision not to transit. 
Number 1 for the most important factor. If a factor has no importance at 
all, please leave blank. 
Factors Ranks 
Suez Canal's high tolls 1 
Fears of ships hijacked 1 
Increase in Bunker prices 4 
Increase in insurances premium 3 
Long waiting time 3 
Not safe to navigate 1 
Inflexibility in dealing with ship-owners 6 
Unfriendly SCA staff 6 
Corruption of the administration regime 6 
Vessel expenditure via the Suez canal compared to the 
Cape of Good Hope in the current economic conditions 
2 
12. An ongoing project is being undertaken to expand the Panama Canal by 
including a third lock and wider canal for large container vessels to 
accommodate Suezmax, taking some trade patterns from the Suez canal 
to the Panama Canal. Do you think that the achievement of this project 
will have an influence on your decision to keep sending your ships via the 
Suez Canal toward North East America (Please answer this question, if 
you have a service to North East America? 
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Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
D D D D
 
Please add any additional comments in the space below: 
Many thanks for your time and kind support. 
Bilel Hadidi 
Please N.B 
If you're sending the questionnaire by post. Kindly post it to: 
Bilel Hadidi 
35 Hartington road, Southampton, 
S0140EW 
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Bilel Hadidi (Mr) 
MSc in International Maritime Studies­
Ship and Shipping Management 
Southampton Solent University 
Tel: +44 (0)78446681114 
Email: bilelhadidi@yahoo.co.uk 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Topic: An investigation into the current and future economic 
Viability of the Suez Canal 
This questionnaire is part of a research project I am conducting for my Masters 
dissertation. All data will be solely used for academic purposes and will not be passed 
on to any commercial or other third parties. 
Please fill in the questionnaire by ticking the right box (*) 
Personal information: 
Name: Cris David . 
Position: . 
Address: . 
1. How often do you think your company's ships transit the Suez Canal? 
D Once a week	 Twice or more a week D
D Once every two weeks Once a month o
 
2.	 What do you think about the request/reply time in order to book place in 
the convoy 
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D Very Efficient o Reasonably good D Average D Poor 
3.	 Is the process (Booking, regulations, and paperwork's, inspections, and 
tolls payment) well structured, formulated and comprehensive? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D r. D D 
4.	 What do you think about the Toll paid to the SCA, is it worth the service? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D .. D 
5.	 What do you think of the convoy systems: 
Highly effective, Effective, reasonable Not very effective 
D 0 D D 
6.	 Do you think the transit could be faster, if the Suez Canal re-structures 
the convoy system? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D .. D 
7.	 Do you receive negative complain from masters about the inefficiency of 
the Suez Canal 
All the time Some times not many not at all 
D D o D 
8.	 Can you please list up to four type of complains you have received from 
your masters or crew in the last two years with regard to service provided 
by the Suez Canal Authority 
Not permitting bunkers prior to joining Gully-gully men 
Pilots expecting food, drink and bribes Inadequate Security from criminals 
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Does the effectiveness of the service provided by the Suez contractors 
(Boatman company, canal agents, Pilots, influence your decision to transit the 
Canal? 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D D o D
 
9.	 How do you feel about this statement? The privization of the canal will 
lead to more regulated and controlled services, increase in traffic and 
reduction in tolls. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree, Strongly disagree 
D o D D
 
10. Please rank the factors in this table in order of importance with regard to 
the way they may influence your company's decision not to transit. 
Number 1 for the most important factor. If a factor has no importance at 
all, please leave blank. 
Factors Ranks 
Suez Canal's high tolls 1 
Fears of ships hijacked 2 
Increase in Bunker prices 7 
Increase in insurances premium 1 
Long waiting time 3 
Not safe to navigate 6 
Inflexibility in dealing with ship-owners 6 
Unfriendly SCA staff 7 
Corruption of the administration regime 3 
Vessel expenditure via the Suez canal compared to the 
Cape of Good Hope in the current economic conditions 
1 
Please add any additional comments in the space below: 
N/A 
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Many thanks for your time and kind support. 
Bilel Hadidi 
Please N.B 
If you're sending the questionnaire by post. Kindly post it to: 
Bilel Hadidi 
35 Hartington roads, Southampton, 
S0140EW 
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Appendix 9: Minutes of my meeting with my supervisor: 
1.	 Date: 15-07-2009; meeting time at 11.00; duration: 30 minutes; Supervisor's 
comments: topic indentified and objectives not yet clear 
2.	 Date: 27-08-2009; meeting time at 13.00; duration: 30 minutes; Supervisor's 
comments: Objective clear and supervisor gives the go a head to start literature 
reviews, introduction and methodology. 
3.	 Date: 03-08-2009; meeting time at 11.30; duration: 30 minutes; Supervisor's 
comments: Literatures review well structured and written, advised few changes and 
move on to the finding. 
4.	 Sate: 10-08-2009; updated my supervisor with my progress so far via email: 
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